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STATE COURTS, THE RIGHT TO VOTE, AND THE
DEMOCRACY CANON
Rebecca Guthrie*
Entire elections can be determined by the way a state judge chooses to
interpret an election statute. And yet, there has been little scholarly attention
on how judges construe statutes regulating elections at the state level. This
Note begins to redress that lack of attention by undertaking an in-depth
analysis of one interpretive tool historically invoked by state courts. The
“Democracy Canon” is a substantive canon urging courts to liberally
construe election statutes in favor of voter enfranchisement. By conducting
a review of both historical and modern references to the Democracy Canon
by state courts, this Note argues that courts have become less willing to rely
on the Democracy Canon in recent decades. At the same time, codification
of the Democracy Canon, and perhaps other substantive canons, by state
legislatures may alleviate most concerns of courts about using substantive
canons and may be the solution to revitalize the Democracy Canon.
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INTRODUCTION
Most of us would assume that we have fulfilled the ideals of democracy as
soon as we exit the voting polls. By submitting our ballots, we have
expressed our will and the democratic process is complete. However, in the
words of playwright Tom Stoppard, “[i]t’s not the voting that’s democracy,
it’s the counting.”1 With a spike in the number of election disputes over the
last twenty years,2 state courts are playing an increasingly important role in
the outcome of elections.3 Courts determine who can vote, for whom we can
vote, and which votes will count. For example, courts have determined the
outcomes of entire elections by interpreting words and phrases like “obvious
1. TOM STOPPARD, JUMPERS 35 (1972).
2. As of 2008, the number of election cases in state courts had tripled since the late 1990s.
See Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 89 (2009).
3. For an analysis of how state court election decisions shape the constitutional right to
vote, see generally Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(2016).
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error,”4 “overvote,”5 and “must.”6 With courts having so much power in
determining elections, how can citizens make sure that the democratic
process remains in their hands and not the judiciary’s? One answer lies with
understanding how these courts interpret and apply relevant election statutes.
Most states have constitutions that ensure the right to vote (either
implicitly or explicitly),7 a legislature that enacts laws outlining election
procedures,8 election officials who carry out those procedures, and judges
who interpret and apply the procedures whenever there is a dispute. Thus,
election disputes will very often be resolved by courts interpreting election
statutes.9 How courts interpret these can, in some instances, completely
nullify a vote, replacing the citizens’ choice with the court’s own opinion of
the correct result. This Note seeks to understand whether judicial statutory
interpretation has actually ensured that the democratic process remains with
the people.
Part I of this Note explores the legal background of both statutory
interpretation by courts and election laws enacted by legislatures. These two
worlds converge when a state legislature codifies canons of construction
specific to the interpretation of its election laws. The most prominent of these
canons is the “Democracy Canon,” which is examined more thoroughly in
Part I.B. Part I.C explains the methodology used in this Note to analyze state
courts’ and legislatures’ employment of the Democracy Canon.
This Note provides both a longitudinal and latitudinal review of the
Democracy Canon. Part II undertakes the longitudinal review, looking at
every case from the highest courts of four states that applied the Canon since
the nineteenth century. By providing an in-depth historical analysis, this Part
highlights that references to the Democracy Canon in modern times are more
likely to lead to disenfranchisement10 of voters than was the case before
1960.11
Part III seeks to understand this shift by exploring state court decisions
invoking the Democracy Canon from all fifty states after 2000 (the latitudinal
review). This dataset confirms that courts are almost as likely to
disenfranchise voters as to enfranchise them when courts discuss the
Canon.12 There are several justifications in the state courts’ reasons for
rejecting the Democracy Canon, including the rise of textualism, the impact
of other state legislative interests, and judicial concerns about infringing on
the legislature.13 Lastly, Part IV suggests that state legislatures can revitalize
4. See Coleman v. Ritchie, 762 N.W.2d 218, 225 (Minn. 2009).
5. See Edgmon v. State, 152 P.3d 1154, 1157 (Alaska 2007).
6. See Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1239 (Fla. 2000).
7. See infra note 15.
8. See infra note 16.
9. In 2008, almost 71 percent of election cases in state courts were purely questions of
statutory interpretation. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 91.
10. For an overview of techniques historically used to disenfranchise certain voters, see
generally MICHAEL DIMINO ET AL., VOTING RIGHTS AND ELECTION LAW 1–8 (2d ed. 2015).
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See infra Part III.A.2.
13. See infra Part III.B.
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the Democracy Canon by codifying it as a statutory rule of construction.14
This Note concludes by offering some reasons for why codification of
substantive canons in general would mitigate judges’ concerns about
employing such tools when undertaking a statutory analysis.
I. THE INTERSECTION OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND ELECTIONS
The right to vote is almost entirely state-based, either guaranteed in state
constitutions15 or protected in state legislation.16 Thus, state judges “are
often the main actors in defining the constitutional right to vote” by
interpreting the state’s constitution, statutes, and regulations.17 For this
reason, state election laws offer an ideal playing field for analyzing state
statutory interpretation methods. This field is even more bountiful in that it
allows us to consider the impact of codified rules of construction. One of
these codified canons is the Democracy Canon, first discussed by Richard
Hasen.18 The Democracy Canon is a substantive canon that calls for courts
to interpret election statutes “with a thumb on the scale in favor of voter
enfranchisement.”19 The Democracy Canon, which several state legislatures
have codified as a legislatively mandated rule of construction,20 provides
ample opportunity to study the intersection of statutory interpretation and
election law. To fully understand the impact of the Democracy Canon, it is
necessary to first highlight some important aspects about substantive canons
and codified rules of construction.
A. Statutory Interpretation at the State Level
For more than a century, scholars have debated the best way to interpret
statutes at the federal level.21 Statutory interpretation in practice, however,
is very different at the state level than at the federal level.22 This is due in
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 89, 101–04 (2014) (noting the constitutional provisions in all fifty states that provide
voting protection).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof . . . .”); see also Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the Secretary: The
Crucial Role of State Election Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to
Democracy, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 343, 354–57 (2008) (providing various ways in
which state legislatures impact election administration).
17. Douglas, supra note 3, at 3.
18. Hasen, supra note 2, at 71.
19. Id. (emphasis omitted).
20. See infra Appendix A.
21. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 478 (5th ed. 2014) (providing
a brief timeline of statutory interpretation theories).
22. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1755
(2010) (“[S]tate court developments may be changing the terms of the statutory interpretation
debate in ways that may be far more productive than anything currently happening in the
federal arena.”).
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part to the codification by state legislatures of rules of statutory construction,
a phenomenon that has not occurred to the same degree at the federal level.23
1. Codified Rules of Construction
While canons of statutory interpretation exist only as a part of the common
law at the federal level,24 all fifty states have enacted statutory canons,
informing the courts on how their statutes should be interpreted.25 The
codification of interpretative canons began in the nineteenth century with
legislatures enacting provisions instructing courts to liberally construe
certain statutes.26 Over time, state legislatures have enacted all types of
interpretative canons, including textual canons, extrinsic source canons, and
substantive canons.27 These codified rules of construction have raised
constitutional concerns, namely, whether legislatures are infringing on the
judicial sphere in telling courts how to interpret the law.28
State legislatures enact these rules of construction to instruct courts on how
to interpret their work product. In practice, these codified canons might not
be successful, as state courts have either ignored the rules or have navigated
their way around them.29 For example, Abbe Gluck analyzes how the
Connecticut Supreme Court has purposefully avoided the state’s codified
plain meaning rule by simply finding ambiguity in the statutes before the
court.30 Theoretically, such skirmishes could be understood as a type of
interbranch dialogue,31 but the practical consequences may make this theory
less persuasive.32 Further, the adoption of a particular theory of statutory
23. While the United States Congress has enacted some statutory directives, it has not
attempted to codify a comprehensive set of interpretive canons. See, e.g., Linda D. Jellum,
“Which Is to Be the Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature?: When Statutory Directives
Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 846–54 (2009) (providing various
examples of statutory directives but noting that “Congress has not enacted a general theoretical
directive”).
24. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2093 (2002) (describing federal courts’ canons as “pure common law”).
25. See generally Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation,
98 GEO. L.J. 341 (2010) (providing an in-depth analysis of codified canons in every state).
26. See Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
211, 215–17 (1994) (outlining the history of codified rules of construction).
27. See Scott, supra note 25, at 352.
28. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1826–27 (Codified rules of construction “raise[] new
questions about which branch—judicial or legislative—primarily controls methodological
choice” of interpretation techniques.); see also Jellum, supra note 23, at 842 (arguing that
codified rules of construction are unconstitutional “when enacted to apply generally to many
statutes”); Rosenkranz, supra note 24, at 2102–03 (arguing in support of federal codified rules
of construction).
29. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1824–25 (providing examples of courts avoiding or
ignoring legislated rules); see also Romero, supra note 26, at 241–42 (noting several practical
limitations on how codified canons impact judicial decision-making).
30. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1795–96; see also infra Part II.A.1.
31. See James J. Brudney & Ethan J. Leib, Statutory Interpretation as “Interbranch
Dialogue”?, 66 UCLA L. REV. 346, 390–98 (2019) (exploring the benefits of conceptualizing
statutory interpretation as dialogue).
32. See id. at 378–79 (noting that judicial concerns over the constitutional implications of
codified rules may limit the interbranch dialogue concept). It is possible that these statutes
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interpretation by individual judges can make the impact of codified canons
more nuanced.33
2. Substantive Canons
The codification of rules of construction is further complicated when one
considers substantive canons. Substantive canons are the judge-made
presumptions used “to protect important background norms derived from the
Constitution, common-law practices, or policies related to particular subject
areas.”34 Courts use these presumptions to favor “polic[ies] that courts have
identified as worthy of special protection,” meaning that courts apply these
presumptions in a nonneutral way with respect to those policies.35 These
canons have generated plenty of debate. Scholars and judges bemoan
substantive canons as allowing courts to decide cases based on their personal
policy preferences,36 with Justice Antonin Scalia famously referring to them
as “dice-loading rules.”37 Not only do these substantive canons permit
judges (unelected at the federal level) to consider policy issues but they act
as a tool for the judiciary to displace the legislature’s policy preferences.38
In this regard, substantive canons may raise constitutional concerns about the
proper role of the judiciary.39 Additionally, some scholars see substantive

still curb judicial discretion to a degree by forcing the judge to “approach their task with an
appropriate comportment to the job [instead of] imagin[ing] that they are in conversation with
no one but themselves.” Id. at 391. A close analysis of developments in five states, however,
finds that these rules do little to dissuade courts from relying on their own interpretative
methods. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1824–25.
33. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1826–27 (finding that “state judges who reject the
legislated rules . . . are self-proclaimed textualists”).
34. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825,
833 (2017).
35. JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 266
(2010).
36. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 109, 119 (2010) (“It is difficult to isolate a single policy objective behind any substantive
canon, for a canon’s purpose often lies in the eyes of the beholder.”); James J. Brudney &
Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1, 109 (2005) (Empirical data of the U.S. Supreme Court’s canon usage
suggests that substantive canons “are functioning more as a façade to promote judicial policy
preferences than as a principled methodological tool.”). But see Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 647, 656 (1992) (arguing that judges only rely on canons when they do not have
personal policy preferences).
37. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 3, 28 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
38. See Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn?: Should Congress Turn
Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992) (arguing that substantive canons
“clearly reflect judicial, not congressional, policy concerns”).
39. See Scalia, supra note 37, at 29 (noting that substantive canons raise “the question of
where the courts get the authority to impose” such rules).
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canons as resulting in unpredictable decisions, eroding the ideals of uniform
law and predictable decision-making.40
However, substantive canons are not entirely nefarious. These canons can
act as a shield, allowing courts to watch over certain rights or classes of
individuals that have historically required more protection—the rule of lenity
being a classic example.41 Unpredictable decision-making may not be such
a bad result if it means that courts are protecting individual rights.
Additionally, substantive canons allow courts to notify legislatures about the
courts’ expectations for statutes by communicating to the legislatures how
the courts will fill in statutory gaps.42
Codifying substantive canons adds yet another complication to this
inquiry. One such codified canon is the rule of liberal construction.43 Thirtysix states have adopted some form of the liberal construction rule, with
seventeen of those states having provisions instructing courts to liberally
construe all statutes.44 The rule to liberally construe statutes has been the
topic of much debate and confusion45 and is often depicted as a tool for
judges “to impose their own values on society.”46 Critics see the rule of
liberal construction as providing for far too much judicial discretion at the
expense of the integrity of the legislative process.47 Thus, any statute asking
40. See Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory
Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L.
REV. 71, 123 (2018) (finding that the Roberts Court’s use of canons “raise[s] significant
questions about whether canons improve interpretive predictability, constrain judicial
discretion, or supply a stable interpretive background for Congress”); Scalia, supra note 37,
at 28 (“[I]t is virtually impossible to expect uniformity and objectivity when there is added,
on one or the other side of the balance, a thumb of indeterminate weight.”).
41. Other examples include the principle that courts should construe statutes about
veterans’ benefits liberally in favor of the veterans, see King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S.
215, 220–21 (1991), and the presumption to construe “ambiguities in deportation statutes in
favor of aliens.” ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 21, at 1214 & n.229 (discussing the inconsistent
application of this presumption).
42. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2162, 2284 (2002) (noting that canons can be used to “maximize the satisfaction of legislative
preferences by procuring more explicit legislative action”). Concerns about the effectiveness
of interbranch dialogue may complicate Elhauge’s theory. See supra notes 31–32.
43. See Scott, supra note 25, at 399–401.
44. See id. at 402 tbl.11.
45. See Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal Construction, 64
ALB. L. REV. 9, 12–23 (2000) (undertaking an extensive review of the Canon); Antonin Scalia,
Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 581 (1989–
90) (referring to the liberal construction rule as “the prime example of lego-babble”).
46. Mullins, supra note 45, at 37 (rejecting this characterization).
47. A common critique of the rule of liberal construction stems from the idea that
legislation is the result of legislators compromising to find a middle ground that satisfies a
majority on both sides of the aisle. If they lead to a deviation from a given compromise,
instructions to liberally construe a statute are in direct conflict with the importance of that
compromise in creating legislation. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 95 (2009) (“[T]he liberal interpretation of remedial statutes may
go well beyond the legislature’s compromise solution.”); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING
STATUTES 53 (2014) (“[T]he courts can use [canons] in ways that fundamentally shape
outcomes differently than how Congress intended . . . .”). Another critique is that
congressional awareness of such canons would paralyze the legislative process entirely. See
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the courts to liberally construe a provision is approached with skepticism by
some.
The fact that citizens elect most state judges48 may mollify fears about
substantive canons at the state level. When a judge is elected, rather than
appointed, some argue that she can (or should) have greater leeway in
considering policy reasons when interpreting statutes.49 Using substantive
canons may allow an elected judge to consider how her constituents would
want her to decide the case while staying within the bounds of the rule of
law.50 At the very least, elected judges’ reliance on substantive canons is
limited by the will of their constituents, who can vote the judge out if a canon
elicits undesirable results.51 Either way, critiques of substantive canons
might hold less weight when citizens elect both the legislator and judge.
B. The Democracy Canon: A Tool for Interpreting State Election Laws
Richard Hasen was the first to identify and explore the Democracy Canon,
beginning by taking a deep dive into its historical references.52 Hasen traces
the Democracy Canon back to as early as 1885 when the Texas Supreme
Court held that “[a]ll statutes tending to limit the citizen in his exercise of
this right [to vote] should be liberally construed in his favor.”53 Such
language has appeared throughout the following two centuries in state court
decisions resulting in the enfranchisement of voters.54 Hasen urges that the
“Democracy Canon forces legislators to make their intent more visible to
all”55 and so courts should use it as a tool to enforce the underenforced
constitutional norm of voting equality.56
Yet Hasen is aware of the havoc the Democracy Canon may wreak. He
acknowledges that the Democracy Canon is susceptible to one of the major
ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 26–27 (1997) (“[A] bill drafter’s awareness of this rule of interpretation
would . . . guarantee the defeat of the bill if he or she were to take the position that no
compromise is possible because the courts will ignore it.”). But see Krishnakumar, supra note
34, at 841 (finding some instances where “the [Roberts] Court seeks to use substantive canons
to honor congressional intent”).
48. For an overview of the judicial selection systems in all fifty states, see Roy A.
Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1084–86 (2007).
For a review of the 2018 judicial elections, see State Supreme Court Elections, 2018,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/State_supreme_court_elections,_2018
[https://
perma.cc/N2DP-UV6Q] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
49. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory
Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1238 (2012) (exploring the idea of “interpretive
divergence” in which elected judges have a greater degree of freedom in interpreting statutes).
50. Id. at 1246–48.
51. This argument is more nuanced than it appears at first blush since voters tend to pay
less attention to judicial reelections than elections for other offices. See id. at 1231–35.
52. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 75–83.
53. Owens v. State ex rel. Jennett, 64 Tex. 500, 509 (1885); see also Hasen, supra note 2,
at 71–72 (discussing Owens).
54. Hasen, supra note 2, at 75–81 (providing numerous examples of the Democracy
Canon throughout history).
55. Id. at 103.
56. Id. at 97.
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criticisms of substantive canons: “it can play a role in the actual and
perceived politicization of the judiciary.”57 Scholars have been quick to
highlight other problems with the Democracy Canon. Chad Flanders decries
the Democracy Canon as favoring one legitimate democratic hallmark (the
right to vote) over another (the legislative process).58 Justin Levitt raises
concerns about the inconsistent application of the Democracy Canon since
“the search for statutory ambiguity seems to depend largely on the will of the
judge in question.”59 Christopher Elmendorf opines that the Democracy
Canon’s detriments outweigh its benefits.60 One such detriment comes from
placing the burden on the legislature to either state, ex ante, that a provision
should be strictly construed or correct a court’s overly liberal interpretation
of a statute.61 Such requirements, Elmendorf argues, waste lawmaker energy
and displace other issues on the legislative agenda.62
Hasen suggests ways to address some of these concerns. He argues that
the Democracy Canon will not be seen as delegitimizing the courts if the
public is educated on the Canon’s consistent usage63 and if the state
legislatures “act ex ante to prevent state court overreaching.”64 In other
words, “a state legislature concerned about state court application of the
Democracy Canon . . . can use clear statements to negate its application.”65
Colorado, Hasen points out, provides an example of effective dialogue
between the legislature and the courts: the Colorado legislature enacted a
Democracy Canon provision but clearly stated throughout its election code
when a provision should be strictly construed.66
Yet as previously discussed, it is unclear how effective the codification of
interpretation canons is in restraining judicial discretion.67 Is Hasen’s
suggestion of ex ante legislative action enough to ease concerns about the

57. Id. at 106; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
58. See Chad Flanders, Election Law Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1369,
1373–74 (2012). Flanders suggests that courts should not apply the Democracy Canon to
election laws that are facially neutral when enacted (or are “behind a veil of ignorance”)
because legislators cannot manipulate these statutes to favor a certain candidate or party. See
id. at 1373.
59. Justin Levitt, Resolving Election Error: The Dynamic Assessment of Materiality, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 83, 155 (2012).
60. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
1051, 1054 (2010).
61. See id. at 1062–63.
62. See id. at 1066. For Richard Hasen’s response to Elmendorf’s critiques, see generally
Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of the Democracy Canon and the Virtues of Simplicity: A
Reply to Professor Elmendorf, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1173 (2010).
63. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 112. But see Elmendorf, supra note 60, at 1055.
64. Hasen, supra note 2, at 106.
65. Id. at 74; see also Eric H. Kearney et al., Perfect Is the Enemy of Fair: An Analysis
of Election Day Error in Ohio’s 2012 General Election Through a Discussion of the
Materiality Principle, Compliance Standards, and the Democracy Canon, 62 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 279, 312–13 (2014) (arguing in favor of ex ante codification).
66. See Hasen, supra note 62, at 1180. For further discussion on Colorado’s codified
Democracy Canon provision, see infra Part II.B.1.
67. See supra notes 36–38.
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Democracy Canon? Or is Colorado an outlier? This Note seeks to clarify
this issue.
C. Methodology: Organization of the States
To assess the impact of the codified Democracy Canon on state courts, I
began by reviewing the election codes and general rules of construction for
all fifty states. From this survey, I divided the fifty states into three
categories: (1) Democracy Canon codified; (2) rejection or disregard of the
Democracy Canon; and (3) semi–Democracy Canon codified.68 The
Democracy Canon codified category includes states with provisions advising
that either (a) the entire election code should be construed broadly in favor
of the right to vote or (b) particular sections within the election code should
be liberally construed in favor of the right to vote. This category includes
fourteen states.69
The second category, rejection or disregard of the Democracy Canon,
includes states that either have no codified liberal construction rule or have
codified rules of construction that advise courts against considering the
purpose or spirit of the statute, both of which are inherently incompatible
with the Democracy Canon.70 There are fourteen states in this category.71
The third category, semi–Democracy Canons codified, includes states
where the relevant statutes could either favor the Democracy Canon or
another state interest would limit enfranchisement, like the state’s interest in
preventing election fraud. This category includes states that have (a) a
general provision to construe statutes liberally that is not specifically about
election provisions or (b) a provision stating that the election code’s purpose
is to uphold both the right to vote and the integrity of the election process by
preventing fraud.72 There are twenty-two states in this category.73 This Note
analyzes how the codification of the Democracy Canon (or the lack thereof)
affects decisions regarding election disputes at the highest courts of certain
states.
For the longitudinal review in Part II, I chose specific states to analyze in
greater depth by considering three factors. I selected states that (1) offer a
range of geographically diverse locations; (2) are varied in terms of the
categorization of codified Democracy Canons and have varied histories of
codifying the Democracy Canon; and (3) have at least ten cases in which the
68. See infra Appendix A.
69. See infra Appendix A.
70. Such a claim of incompatibility is, of course, a generalization. However, because
liberal construction is often aligned with legislative purpose, see Mullins, supra note 45, at
45–46, and the Democracy Canon specifically relies on the purpose of election laws, these
provisions rejecting the spirit of the law should, in theory, make it more difficult for courts to
invoke the Democracy Canon.
71. See infra Appendix A.
72. An example of a provision falling into this second group is Wyoming. See WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 22-2-101(b) (2020) (“This Election Code shall be construed so that all legally qualified
electors may register and vote, that those who are not qualified shall not vote, and that fraud
and corruption in elections shall be prevented.”).
73. See infra Appendix A.
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state’s highest court explicitly accepted or rejected the Democracy Canon.74
Based on these three factors, Part II analyzes the Democracy Canon decisions
from Nevada (Democracy Canon codified), Colorado (semi–Democracy
Canon codified), Connecticut (rejection or disregard of the Democracy
Canon), and Arkansas (semi–Democracy Canon codified). I have collected
all the election decisions at the four states’ highest courts that in some way
reference the Democracy Canon,75 with the earliest case decided in 1883.76
I categorized these decisions further based on the type of election dispute,
using the same three types of disenfranchisement as Hasen. The first group
is vote counting cases, in which enfranchisement is determined based on the
court’s decision to either count or void the challenged ballots.77 The second
group, voter eligibility or registration cases, involves disputes where citizens
argue that they have been denied the right to vote prior to election day.78
Lastly, candidate or party competitiveness cases are disputes in which a
candidate claims to have been wrongly denied the ability to seek election.79
The methodology for the dataset in Part III, which considers a broader range
of more recent Democracy Canon decisions, is detailed in Part III.A.
II. LONGITUDINAL REVIEW OF THE DEMOCRACY CANON
Initially, it appears that states have seen a decline in references to the
Democracy Canon; searches for the case law yielded results mostly from
before 1960.80 Originally, undertaking a longitudinal review was meant to
provide support for this observation. However, an analysis of the
Connecticut, Arkansas, Nevada, and Colorado case law suggested the
opposite: some of these courts were invoking the Democracy Canon after
1960 almost as often as they had before 1960. Of the utmost importance,
however, is that in these states, the courts in recent decades are much more
likely to invoke the Democracy Canon and still decide the case in a way that
disenfranchises voters. Thus, even in states where the courts have
consistently relied upon the Democracy Canon, the Canon’s appearance is
more likely today to lead to disenfranchisement, a sort of decline in and of
itself.
74. It should be noted that no court refers to the presumption to liberally construe election
statutes as the “Democracy Canon.” Richard Hasen coined this phrase to describe the
presumption referred to by courts.
75. I used a variety of methods to locate these decisions, including West Key Number 53
under the topic Election Law (142T). I also searched each jurisdiction with various Boolean
searches (for example, “‘liberally construe’ AND election OR vote” and “statute AND
election OR vote”). I found additional cases by using LexisNexis’s “Shepardizing” feature
and Westlaw’s “Citing References” feature.
76. See Stinson v. Sweeney, 30 P. 997 (Nev. 1883).
77. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 83. For an example of a case in this group, see infra notes
190–95 and accompanying text (discussing Moran v. Carlstrom).
78. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 83.
79. See id. at 84. For example, a court can disenfranchise a voter by not permitting a
candidate from the voter’s political party to appear on the ballot. See, e.g., Butts v. Bysiewicz,
5 A.3d 932 (Conn. 2010); see also infra notes 103–11.
80. This was clear in both my use of the relevant Key Number and in my Boolean
searches. See supra note 75.
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Before turning to each state’s analysis, this dataset (collected in
Appendices B–E) warrants a few caveats. First, this analysis only looks at
decisions that in some way invoke the Democracy Canon and so does not
itself reflect whether the Democracy Canon is often or rarely invoked by
courts in election disputes. Similarly, this analysis does not suggest that these
four states are more likely to disenfranchise voters today than they were in
the first half of the twentieth century, as that is beyond the scope of this Note.
A. No Historically Codified Democracy Canon
Part II.A explores how state courts have historically engaged with the
Democracy Canon when the state legislature has either hinted that the court
should not use the Canon (Connecticut) or remained silent on the issue
(Arkansas).
1. Connecticut
Though Connecticut has codified rules of construction, there is no liberal
construction provision.81 Instead, section 1-2z of the General Statutes of
Connecticut endorses the plain meaning rule.82 Limiting the courts to a plain
meaning interpretation implies that the Connecticut legislature does not wish
the courts to implement canons like the Democracy Canon if the statutory
language is unambiguous.83
Connecticut’s use of the Democracy Canon before 1960 is more varied
than some of the other states in this analysis.84 Of the nine cases invoking
the Canon before 1960, three led to the disenfranchisement of voters, five
enfranchised voters, and one case was split.85 The first instance of the
Democracy Canon comes in Chief Justice Charles Bartlett Andrews’s dissent
in Talcott v. Philbrick.86 Citing a concern for fraudulent voting, the majority
voided 286 votes cast on ballots issued by the Republican Party that
contained the word “citizens” and thus purported to be issued by the citizens,
81. In addition, my research yielded no instances of a codified Democracy Canon in the
historical Connecticut statutes available for review.
82. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2z (2020) (“The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance,
be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after
examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the
meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”).
83. Section 1-2z was enacted in 2003, in reaction to the Connecticut Supreme Court’s
decision in State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562 (Conn. 2003) to no longer use the plain meaning
rule. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1791–92 (analyzing this conflict between the Connecticut
Supreme Court and legislature).
84. See infra Appendix B.
85. For Part II, I use “split” to refer to decisions in which the court both enfranchised and
disenfranchised voters. For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Walsh would
not apply a liberal construction when the circumstances of the disputed ballots “preclude[d]
the idea that they were the result of ignorance, accident, or mistake.” 25 A. 1, 5 (Conn. 1892);
see also infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. Because the court assumed that there was
intentional misconduct, the court only counted some, but not all, of the challenged ballots. See
Walsh, 25 A. at 6.
86. 20 A. 436, 439 (Conn. 1890) (Andrews, C.J., dissenting).
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not a specific party.87 The majority held that this violated the statute
requiring “the ballots [to] contain only the names of the candidates, the office
voted for, and the name of the political party issuing the same.”88 Chief
Justice Andrews, the former governor of Connecticut,89 argued that the
majority’s construction of the statute would actually encourage fraud because
political parties could purposefully void certain votes by handing out ballots
listing the incorrect party name.90 Given this absurd result, Andrews
believed the court should count the votes since “no voter is to be
disfranchised, and no ballot is to be declared void, on doubtful
construction.”91 Andrews cited to other states’ decisions, including Kellogg
v. Hickman92 from Colorado93 and Owens v. State ex rel. Jennett94 from
Texas,95 to bolster his Democracy Canon argument.96 Yet, the court did not
adopt Andrews’s view until two years later in State v. Walsh.97 Though the
court rejected some votes (making the case a split decision), the court adopted
a “presumption in favor of the voter.”98 This presumption led almost entirely
to decisions resulting in voter enfranchisement for the next sixty years.99
Though the Connecticut Supreme Court often relied on the Democracy
Canon to enfranchise voters in the first half of the century, the court
consistently used it to disenfranchise voters after 1960; of the eight cases
decided after 1960 that invoked the Democracy Canon, seven
disenfranchised voters and one was a split decision.100 These eight decisions
include some election disputes in which the court refused to even entertain a
87. Id. at 437 (majority opinion).
88. Id.
89. See Gov. Charles Bartlett Andrews, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/
governor/charles-bartlett-andrews/ [https://perma.cc/6KWM-DYJS] (last visited Mar. 17,
2020).
90. Talcott, 20 A. at 439–40 (Andrews, C.J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 439.
92. 21 P. 325 (Colo. 1889).
93. See infra Part II.B.1.
94. 64 Tex. 500 (1885).
95. See supra note 53.
96. See Talcott, 20 A. at 439 (Andrews, C.J., dissenting).
97. 25 A. 1 (Conn. 1892).
98. Id. at 4.
99. See, e.g., Scully v. Town of Westport, 145 A.2d 742, 745 (Conn. 1958) (validating
absentee ballots when noncompliance with statutes did not affect voters); Flanagan v. Hynes,
54 A. 737, 738 (Conn. 1903) (counting ballots for a candidate that was not the official party
candidate because of the presumption of liberal construction); Merrill v. Reed, 52 A. 409, 410
(Conn. 1902) (Violations of the statute “were not sufficient to make the ballot void, under the
principles of construction applicable to those provisions of our election laws which tend
toward limiting the privileges of the elector.”); Coughlin v. McElroy, 43 A. 854, 856 (Conn.
1899) (counting ballots with illegal marks on them because of a liberal construction);
Fessenden v. Bossa, 37 A. 977, 979 (Conn. 1897) (“Where the legislature in express terms
says that a ballot shall be void for some cause, the courts must undoubtedly hold it to be void;
but no voter is to be disfranchised on a doubtful construction, and statutes tending to limit the
exercise of the ballot should be liberally construed in his favor.”). But see Denny v. Pratt, 135
A. 40, 41 (Conn. 1926) (finding that the Democracy Canon “cannot prevail as against a
statutory requirement expressed in unmistakable language”).
100. See infra Appendix B.
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Democracy Canon argument, such as when interpreting absentee voting
statutes.101 In other types of disputes, like candidate eligibility cases, the
court acknowledged that the statute in question should be construed liberally
in favor of candidate eligibility, but this presumption “does not authorize [the
court] to ignore the clear intent of the legislature.”102 The court even refused
to rely on the Democracy Canon to grant candidates access in situations
where the result of ineligibility was severe, stripping a major political party
of having any candidate in the election. In Butts v. Bysiewicz,103 the
Connecticut secretary of state refused to place an incumbent judge on the
ballot because the secretary did not receive the judge’s certificate of
endorsement from his political party before the statutory deadline.104 The
record revealed that the candidate mailed the endorsement, as permitted by
the statute, but the secretary never received it nor was it returned to the
candidate.105 The candidate argued that he should appear on the ballot,
giving the voters more candidates to choose from, and that the court should
not honor a strict construction of the statutory deadline.106 The court refused
to extend the deadline for the candidate’s unintentional noncompliance
because “filing deadlines for ballot access ‘are designed to ensure the
integrity of the election process in general.’”107 In a footnote, the court
rejected the candidate’s Democracy Canon argument because he failed to
show that the court’s strict construction “involved the actual
disfranchisement of voters.”108 The disenfranchisement of voters, the court
noted, was not the result of the court’s statutory interpretation but of the
candidate’s untimely inquiry into the status of his endorsement, which meant
he missed the deadline to run as an independent or write-in candidate.109 The
court acknowledged the harsh results of this interpretation—the Republican
candidate would be running unopposed.110 Still, the court felt that it could
not “intervene when the legislature clearly has expressed its intent to require

101. See, e.g., Keeley v. Ayala, 179 A.3d 1249, 1261 (Conn. 2018) (rejecting absentee
ballots for noncompliance because the legislature “enacted a regulatory scheme designed to
prevent fraud as far as practicable by mandating the way in which absentee ballots are to be
handled”). But see In re Election of the U.S. Representative for the Second Cong. Dist., 653
A.2d 79, 105–06 (Conn. 1994) (partially relying on the Democracy Canon to count some
absentee ballots).
102. Bysiewicz v. Dinardo, 6 A.3d 726, 730 (Conn. 2010) (interpreting “attorney at law of
at least ten years” to mean that attorney general candidates must have ten years of litigation
experience); see also id. at 802 (Bishop, J., concurring) (concurring because the majority
“disregards the canon it claims to embrace, namely, that election statutes should be construed
liberally in favor of eligibility” and instead “imports into the statute a restriction on eligibility
that is neither implied nor expressed by the statute’s language”).
103. 5 A.3d 932 (Conn. 2010).
104. Id. at 947.
105. Id. at 935.
106. Id. at 936–37.
107. Id. at 939 (quoting Forcade-Osborne v. Madison Cty. Electoral Bd., 778 N.E.2d 768,
772 (Ill. 2002)).
108. Id. at 937 n.5.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 947.
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strict compliance with the filing deadline . . . . Any relief must come from
the legislature.”111
Similarly, in Gonzalez v. Surgeon,112 the court interpreted a statute to
reject a candidate’s petition to appear on the ballot. In doing so, the court
explicitly rejected the candidate’s Democracy Canon argument, stating that,
while the Democracy Canon has merit, it
does not authorize the court to substitute its views for those of the
legislature or to read into an election statute a limitation on its application
that the legislature easily could have imposed but did not. . . . Accordingly,
the principle that election laws must be liberally construed does not affect
[the court’s] conclusion.113

The four most recent cases from the Connecticut Supreme Court invoking
the Democracy Canon acknowledged the plain meaning provision, section 12z,114 but circumvented the provision by finding the statute ambiguous.115
In these cases, the Connecticut Supreme Court repeatedly found ways not to
restrict its interpretation to the plain meaning.116 For example, in Bysiewicz
v. Dinardo,117 the Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted a statute requiring
a candidate for attorney general to be “an attorney at law of at least ten years’
active practice at the bar of this state.”118 The Court found that the statutory
language was ambiguous119 but still refused to allow the plaintiff to run as a
candidate: “the presumption [in favor of eligibility] does not authorize us to
ignore the clear intent of the legislature that the attorney general must have
some measure of experience in trying cases.”120 Because the plaintiff had no
litigation experience, his candidacy was rejected by the court, despite the
court’s acknowledgment that the statute was ambiguous and the presumption
in favor of greater eligibility would normally require the court to rule in the
candidate’s favor.
This, however, creates an irreconcilable tension: the court finds the
election provision ambiguous to avoid relying on section 1-2z. Yet, when an
election statute is ambiguous, the court’s Democracy Canon precedent urges
the court to liberally construe the provisions in favor of enfranchisement.
Then, despite the ambiguity in the statute, the Democracy Canon is rejected.
111. Id.
112. 937 A.2d 13 (Conn. 2007).
113. Id. at 22.
114. See Keeley v. Ayala, 179 A.3d 1249, 1257 (Conn. 2018); Butts, 5 A.3d at 937;
Bysiewicz v. Dinardo, 6 A.3d 726, 737 (Conn. 2010); Gonzalez, 937 A.2d at 20.
115. See, e.g., Keeley, 179 A.3d at 1262–63 (“To the extent that any ambiguity remains,
we agree with the trial court that the legislative history . . . makes it abundantly clear that the
legislature intended for partisan individuals . . . to be excluded from the process.”); Butts, 5
A.3d at 946 (reviewing the statute’s legislative history to find ambiguity); Gonzalez, 937 A.2d
at 20 (“We conclude that the statute’s reference to ‘any petition page circulated in violation
of this provision’ is ambiguous.”).
116. This pattern is consistent with Abbe Gluck’s observations of the Connecticut Supreme
Court’s reaction to section 1-2z. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1791–92.
117. 6 A.3d 726 (Conn. 2010).
118. Id. at 730.
119. Id. at 737–38.
120. Id. at 741.

1972

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

It is strange for a court that generally embraces a purposivist outlook by
rejecting a codified plain meaning rule to conclude that it cannot “substitute
its views for those of the legislature,”121 despite the inherently purposivist
goals of the Democracy Canon.
Is there any way to reconcile these two positions? The divergence may be
explained by considering that the Connecticut Supreme Court is less apt than
other courts to employ substantive canons, believing that they “should be
employed as a last resort, after all other attempts to garner meaning have been
exhausted.”122 In other words, if the court cannot derive the statute’s purpose
from its plain meaning or legislative history, the court may be unwilling to
solely rely on a substantive canon, like the Democracy Canon, to support
such a broad reading of the statute.
Another simple, yet disconcerting, explanation for this tension is that the
justices’ individual policy concerns were better embodied by
disenfranchisement in these cases. The justices that decided Gonzalez,
Dinardo, and Butts were all appointed by relatively conservative
governors,123 and each of those decisions led to the disenfranchisement of
Democratic candidates.124 However, when the court revisited the issue in
2018 in Keeley v. Ayala,125 the justices, who by this time were mostly
appointed by a Democratic governor,126 still decided to disenfranchise a
Democratic candidate. The court refused to count absentee ballots that were
not returned in one of the methods authorized by the statute.127 Noting that
“vot[ing] by absentee ballot is a special privilege,”128 the court harshly
refused to count the votes out of a concern for fraud.129 Any belief that the
almost entirely Democrat-appointed court would revitalize the Democracy
Canon to protect enfranchisement may have been quashed with the Keeley
decision.

121. Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 937 A.2d 13, 22 (Conn. 2007); see also Butts v. Bysiewicz, 5
A.3d 932, 939 (Conn. 2010).
122. State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 618 (Conn. 2003) (Zarella, J., dissenting); see also
Gluck, supra note 22, at 1829 (finding that state judges who consider themselves textualists
“demote the substantive canons favored by the federal textualists”).
123. These three cases were decided by ten justices: Chase Rogers, Joette Katz, Christine
Vertefeuille, Barry Schaller, William Sullivan, Richard Palmer, Ian McLachlan, Dennis
Eveleigh, Flemming Norcott, Jr., and Peter Zarella. Additionally, Judge Thomas Bishop of
the Connecticut Appellate Court sat with the court to hear Dinardo. Fairly conservative
governors appointed all ten of these justices, as well as Judge Bishop.
124. See Butts, 5 A.3d at 935 (The candidate judge was running as a Democrat.); Dinardo,
6 A.3d at 729 (The plaintiff sought Democratic candidacy for secretary of state.); Gonzalez,
937 A.2d at 16 (The candidate petitioned to appear on the ballot as a Democrat.).
125. 179 A.3d 1249 (Conn. 2018).
126. Seven justices decided Keeley: Richard Palmer, Andrew McDonald, Richard
Robinson, Gregory D’Auria, Raheem Mullins, Maria Araujo Kahns, and Christine
Vertefeuille. A Democratic governor appointed the five newest justices: McDonald,
Robinson, D’Auria, Mullins, and Kahns.
127. Keeley, 179 A.3d at 1261, 1265.
128. Id. at. 1258.
129. Id. at 1258–59.
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2. Arkansas
The Arkansas legislature has never enacted a codified Democracy Canon
and there is no codified Democracy Canon today. Though there is a general
liberal construction provision,130 the Arkansas Supreme Court has not cited
to this provision in adjudicating any election disputes. The court has invoked
the Democracy Canon ten times since 1925 and only three of these cases
were decided after 1960.131 In the early twentieth century, the Arkansas
Supreme Court repeatedly construed certain election statutes liberally but
only enfranchised voters when discussing either election contests132 or
candidate access disputes.133 For example, in Fisher v. Taylor,134 the
appellant, hoping to run for the Arkansas General Assembly but serving in
the navy, gave his mother power of attorney to complete the requirements to
get his name on the ballot.135 This included signing a loyalty pledge and
sending it to the county central committee.136 However, the committee’s
chairman rejected the application, claiming that it did not comply with party
rules since the loyalty pledge was not personally signed by the candidate.137
The trial court denied the candidate a writ of mandamus to compel the
printing of his name on the ballot.138 The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed
because “[t]he right to become a candidate for public office is, under our form
of government, a fundamental right which should not be in any manner
curtailed without good cause.”139 The court seemed to reach this decision,
however, in large part because of the candidate’s naval service: “soldiers and
sailors absent from home in defense of their country have been the objects of
special consideration at the hands of lawmakers and courts.”140

130. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-202 (2020) (“All general provisions, terms, phrases, and
expressions used in any statute shall be liberally construed in order that the true intent and
meaning of the General Assembly may be fully carried out.”).
131. See infra Appendix C. With only ten decisions, Arkansas has the fewest cases
invoking the Democracy Canon of the four states in Part II. Despite having fewer cases, I
chose to include Arkansas so that a state from the Southeast was included, and Arkansas had
the most applicable decisions from the Southern states. Additionally, the Arkansas cases
include election contest disputes, not one of the three categories of disenfranchisement I have
outlined.
132. See, e.g., Gunter v. Fletcher, 233 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Ark. 1950) (relying on the liberal
construction of election statutes as akin to a pleading standard); La Fargue v. Waggoner, 75
S.W.2d 235, 239 (Ark. 1934) (“[T]he statute providing for contesting elections should be
liberally construed, the purpose of the contest being to determine what candidate received the
greatest number of votes.”); Robinson v. Knowlton, 40 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Ark. 1931)
(requiring a new election because “the statute providing for contesting elections should be
liberally construed”). But see Logan v. Russell, 206 S.W. 131, 132 (Ark. 1918) (prohibiting
an election contest because the statute’s language was clear).
133. See, e.g., Fisher v. Taylor, 196 S.W.2d 217, 217 (Ark. 1946).
134. 196 S.W.2d 217 (Ark. 1946).
135. Id. at 217–18.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 217.
139. Id. at 220.
140. Id.
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After 1960, there are only three cases from the Arkansas Supreme Court
that invoke the Democracy Canon; two of these decisions resulted in
enfranchisement, while one resulted in disenfranchisement.141 In Republican
Party of Garland County v. Johnson,142 the Arkansas Supreme Court
narrowly interpreted a statutory deadline to file the candidate’s party
certificate, prohibiting the candidate from appearing on the ballot, even
though the candidate missed the deadline by only a few minutes.143 The court
explicitly rejected the candidate’s Democracy Canon argument, stating that
Fisher “was specifically limited to its facts.”144 Yet, just one month later,
the court in Populist Party of Arkansas v. Chesterfield145 liberally interpreted
a statute dictating procedures about petitions for candidate access. This
broad interpretation permitted Ralph Nader to appear on the 2004
presidential ballot.146 The court, citing to Fisher, stated that “[a]ny law or
party rule, by which this inherent right of the citizen [to become a candidate
for public office] is diminished or impaired ought always to receive a liberal
construction in favor of the citizen desiring to exercise the right.”147
Is there any way to reconcile this inconsistent application? Perhaps the
court is less willing to enfranchise voters via the Democracy Canon when the
violation of the election statute is based on the candidate’s wrongdoing. The
court may expect candidates to have a better understanding of the law or
judges may have less sympathy for candidates. However, this explanation
fails to take into account that the election violation in Fisher was the result
of a candidate’s error. The more likely reason for this inconsistent
application is that the court will employ the Democracy Canon whenever it
feels that a candidate deserves to appear on the ballot, though this inference
is hard to confirm given the small sample of cases available. The justices
sympathized with the candidate in Fisher because he was a member of the
navy during World War II148 and felt Nader deserved to be on the ballot
because he had collected the required number of signatures.149 The court did
not have the same sympathy for the candidate in Republican Party of
Garland County because she failed to meet the deadline for no reason other
than tardiness (despite the candidate testifying that she waited until the last
minute out of fear that she would lose her job since she would be running
against her employer).150 Whether or not the Arkansas Supreme Court’s
inconsistent application of the Democracy Canon is the result of judicial
cherry-picking will only become clearer as the court hears more candidate
access disputes.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See infra Appendix C.
193 S.W.3d 248 (Ark. 2004).
Id. at 250.
Id. at 252 n.2.
195 S.W.3d 354 (Ark. 2004).
Id. at 355.
Id. at 359 (citing Fisher v. Taylor, 196 S.W.2d 217 (Ark. 1946)).
See Fisher v. Taylor, 196 S.W.2d 217, 219–20 (Ark. 1946).
See Populist Party of Ark., 195 S.W.3d at 360 (Brown, J., concurring).
Republican Party of Garland Cty. v. Johnson, 193 S.W.3d 248, 250 (Ark. 2004).
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B. Historically Codified Democracy Canon
The Connecticut and Arkansas analyses show that the Democracy Canon
is more prone to inconsistent results today than it was prior to 1960. The
next inquiry is whether the codification of the Democracy Canon by the state
legislatures impacts this trend.
1. Nevada
Nevada’s legislature enacted the Democracy Canon as early as 1925.151
Today, Nevada’s codified Democracy Canon is found in section 293.127 of
the Nevada Revised Statutes.152 The Nevada Supreme Court relies on the
codified Democracy Canon provision more than any other state in the
Democracy Canon codified category.153 Further, all of the decisions citing
to section 293.127 actually result in the enfranchisement of voters, another
anomaly in this analysis.154 In one case, the Democracy Canon is the only
tool of statutory interpretation relied on to interpret the statute in question.155
Even though the Democracy Canon has consistently been codified in
Nevada, the Nevada Supreme Court’s reliance on the Democracy Canon to
enfranchise voters has still decreased. The court has mentioned the
Democracy Canon twenty-three times since 1883.156 Though the Democracy
Canon has been mentioned relatively consistently,157 it has been rejected
more frequently since the turn of the twenty-first century, which has led to
more decisions to disenfranchise voters.158
151. See 1925 Nev. Stat. 19 (“This statute shall be liberally construed to the end that
minority groups and parties shall have an opportunity to participate in the elections and that
the real will of the electors shall not be defeated . . . .”).
152. NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.127(1) (2020) (“This title must be liberally construed to the
end that: (a) All electors, including, without limitation, electors who are elderly or disabled,
have an opportunity to participate in elections and to cast their votes privately; (b) An eligible
voter with a physical or mental disability is not denied the right to vote solely because of the
physical or mental disability; and (c) The real will of the electors is not defeated by any
informality or by failure substantially to comply with the provisions of this title with respect
to the giving of any notice or the conducting of an election or certifying the results thereof.”).
153. See infra Appendix D. The Nevada Supreme Court has cited to the codified
Democracy Canon provision five times between 1975 and 2009. See generally Lueck v.
Teuton, 219 P.3d 895 (Nev. 2009); Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Nevadans for Sound Gov’t,
100 P.3d 179 (Nev. 2004); Eller Media Co. v. City of Reno, 59 P.3d 437 (Nev. 2002); Long
v. Swackhamer, 538 P.2d 587 (Nev. 1975); LaPorta v. Broadbent, 530 P.2d 1404 (Nev. 1975).
Two of these cases, Lueck and Eller Media Co., have not been included in this analysis because
they do not fall within the three categories of disenfranchisement. The other six cases since
1960 in Appendix D are instances where the court refers to the common-law Canon, without
reference to the codified provision.
154. See infra Appendix H; see also infra Part III.A.2.
155. See Long, 538 P.2d at 589 (finding that the Independent American Party should appear
on the ballot because a “qualified political party that has met standards for qualification should
be afforded an opportunity to express its views at election time through its candidates”).
156. See infra Appendix D.
157. The Canon was invoked twelve times between 1880 and 1960 and eleven times
between 1960 and 2019. See infra Appendix D.
158. While only two of the twelve decisions before 1960 disenfranchised voters, five of the
eleven decisions after 1960 disenfranchised voters. See infra Appendix D.
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These decisions indicate that the court was much more open to the idea of
the Democracy Canon before 1960. For instance, in Buckner v. Lynip,159 the
court validated ballots that had distinguishing marks written on them, despite
a statute that read “[a]ny ballot upon which appears names, words or marks
written or printed . . . shall not be counted.”160 The court opined that
invalidating the ballot for “[s]uch a word or mark would not be within the
spirit of the law, although within its letter” and so applied a liberal
construction to count the ballots.161 The court did not hesitate to rely on the
Democracy Canon despite such clear statutory language.
More recently, the court, though still willing to invoke the Democracy
Canon, tends to do so more as a tiebreaker between two possible
interpretations, as was the case in Cirac v. Lander County.162 In that case,
the court interpreted the statute in question163 to permit a wife with a
community property interest to be considered a “taxpayer” and thus able to
validly sign an initiative petition.164 The court reached this conclusion
because “the right to vote should not be taken away due to a doubtful
statutory construction.”165 Justice Gordon Thompson, in dissent, argued that
“[t]his court is not empowered to annul or alter the legislative direction” of
the statute because the “legislative intent is clearly expressed and there is no
occasion for [statutory] construction.”166 Distressed by the majority’s
disregard for what he considered to be the plain text of the statute, Justice
Thompson concluded with a reminder that wives who own community
property could have listed their names, along with their husbands’ names, on
the assessment roll; for this reason, the wives’ “ineligibility must be
attributed to them rather than to the statutory wording selected by the
legislature.”167 Despite Justice Thompson’s concerns, the majority relied on
the Democracy Canon to decide between two equally plausible
interpretations of the statute: the plain meaning or an interpretation within
the “spirit and meaning” of the statute.168
In the most recent invocation of the Democracy Canon, a unanimous
Nevada Supreme Court refused to rely on the Canon.169 In interpreting the
159. 41 P. 762 (Nev. 1895).
160. Id. at 764.
161. Id. at 766. But see id. at 767 (Belknap, J., dissenting) (“I admit that if my views are
to be adopted the voters of the precinct at that election will be disfranchised, but I am
confronted with what I think are clear and imperative provisions of law, incapable of judicial
construction.”).
162. 602 P.2d 1012 (Nev. 1979).
163. NEV. REV. STAT. § 243.465 (2020) (“Whenever the residents of any county in this
State shall file a petition with the clerk of the board of county commissioners, signed by
qualified electors of the county, who are also taxpayers of the county as appears by the last
real or personal property assessment roll . . . the board of county commissioners shall fix a
time for a public hearing upon the petition . . . .”).
164. See Cirac, 602 P.2d at 1015.
165. Id. at 1016–17.
166. Id. at 1019 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 1020.
168. Id. at 1016 (majority opinion).
169. See Strickland v. Waymire, 235 P.3d 605 (Nev. 2010).
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language of the Nevada Constitution permitting recall petitions, the court had
to determine whether all registered voters could sign a petition to recall or
just those who had voted in the election of the officer facing the potential
recall.170 Respondents, seeking the former result, argued that the Democracy
Canon required the court to count all the signatures and uphold the registered
voters’ right to petition for a recall.171 The court disagreed, finding that the
respondents “conflate[d] the right to submit a petition calling for recall with
the right to vote at the special election that follows, which are two different
things.”172 Although the court had considered invoking the Democracy
Canon in the nineteenth century with regard to recall petitions,173 the court
in Strickland v. Waymire174 affirmatively limited the Democracy Canon’s
relevance in recall disputes.
2. Colorado
Like Nevada, Colorado has a long history of codifying the Democracy
Canon.175 Today, Colorado’s relevant statute is section 1-1-103(1) of the
Colorado Revised Statutes.176 Though Hasen cites this provision as an
example of the codified Democracy Canon,177 I argue that that section 1-1103(1) is only a semi–Democracy Canon provision because the same section
permits courts to disenfranchise voters by including the language regarding
fraud prevention.178 In other words, it is left to the court’s discretion as to
which purpose (fraud prevention or voter accessibility) to prioritize in its
interpretation. The Colorado Supreme Court case law supports this
conclusion:
the court, despite citing to section 1-1-103(1), still
disenfranchises voters.179
In analyzing the Colorado cases invoking the Democracy Canon, there are
more references to the Canon after 1960 than before 1960.180 Yet, the
Canon’s effectiveness has still been in decline: the number of decisions
170. Id. at 613.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See generally State v. Scott, 285 P. 511 (Nev. 1930).
174. 235 P.3d 605 (Nev. 2010).
175. The legislature enacted a Democracy Canon provision as early as 1905. See 1905
Colo. Sess. Laws 190 (“This act shall be liberally construed, so that all legally qualified
electors may be registered, and that those who are not legal electors may be kept from such
registration lists, and that fraud and corruption in elections may be prevented . . . .”).
176. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-1-103(1) (2020) (“This code shall be liberally construed so that
all eligible electors may be permitted to vote and those who are not eligible electors may be
kept from voting in order to prevent fraud and corruption in elections.”).
177. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 79 n.49.
178. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-1-103(1).
179. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Williams, 418 P.3d 478, 486 (Colo. 2018) (refusing to liberally
construe the statute because section 1-1-103(1) does not apply to the statute in question);
Moran v. Carlstrom, 775 P.2d 1176, 1182–83 (Colo. 1989) (undertaking an extensive statutory
analysis in voiding four write-in ballots).
180. The Colorado Supreme Court has invoked the Democracy Canon twenty-four times
since 1889. The Canon was invoked ten times before 1960 and fourteen times after 1960. See
infra Appendix E.
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disenfranchising voters has increased since 1960. While all but one of the
cases before 1960 relying on the Democracy Canon resulted in
enfranchisement, over 40 percent of the decisions after 1960 (six of the
fourteen cases) resulted in disenfranchisement. Of the six cases after 1990,
four resulted in disenfranchisement.181
As was the case in Nevada, the Colorado Supreme Court was much more
willing to rely on the Democracy Canon to overcome the plain meaning of
statutes at the turn of the twentieth century. In the court’s first invocation of
the Canon in Kellogg v. Hickman,182 the court validated ballots that had been
printed on paper not in compliance with the statute. The court counted the
ballots because “the spirit and intention of the law [was] not violated,
although a literal construction would vitiate it.”183 The dissent rejected this
interpretation, arguing that “[a] ballot proscribed as illegal before it is voted,
is not, when voted, converted into a legal ballot.”184 Other cases from the
court at this time followed the approach of the majority.185
Since 1960, however, the Colorado Supreme Court has been less
consistent in its application of the Democracy Canon.186 The court relied on
the Canon in Meyer v. Lamm187 to validate some write-in ballots but void
others.188 The court found that a liberal construction of the write-in statute
is acceptable so that ballots are not rejected when “the intent of the voter to
vote for a particular write-in candidate is clear.”189 In Moran v.
Carlstrom,190 the court cited to the Democracy Canon provision, section 11-103(1), to support the claim that “a ballot cast by a qualified elector should
be rejected only if the elector’s intent cannot be ascertained with reasonable
certainty.”191 When intent cannot be discerned, “the elector’s right to have
the ballot count must give way to the right of the electorate to a fair and
accurate count.”192 Here, four votes were not counted because the voters
placed an “x” next to Moran’s name as well as an “x” next to another
candidate’s name, which had been written in by the voters.193 The court
181. See infra Appendix E.
182. 21 P. 325 (Colo. 1889).
183. Id. at 327.
184. Id. at 331 (Helm, C.J., dissenting).
185. See, e.g., Littlejohn v. People ex rel. Desch, 121 P. 159, 162 (Colo. 1912) (invalidating
legislation that “extend[s] to the denial of the franchise itself”); People ex rel. Johnson v. Earl,
94 P. 294, 298–99 (Colo. 1908) (expanding eligibility of voters by relying on the codified
Democracy Canon provision); Dickinson v. Freed, 55 P. 812, 814 (Colo. 1898) (“[C]ourts will
not undertake to disfranchise any voter, by rejecting his ballot, where his choice can be
gathered from the ballot . . . .”); Allen v. Glynn, 29 P. 670, 674 (Colo. 1892) (Helm, J.,
dissenting) (Election laws are “peculiarly entitled to such judicial construction as will
effectuate its purpose, unless sound legal principles imperatively forbid.”).
186. Of the fourteen cases decided after 1960, seven led to enfranchisement, six led to
disenfranchisement, and one decision was split. See infra Appendix E.
187. 846 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1993) (en banc).
188. Id. at 877–78.
189. Id. at 876.
190. 775 P.2d 1176 (Colo. 1989).
191. Id. at 1180.
192. Id. at 1183.
193. Id. at 1178.
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found it impossible to determine the voters’ intent and so rejected all four
ballots.194 However, as Justice William H. Erickson noted in dissent, the
intent of the four votes in question was easily ascertained given that the other
candidate was ineligible for the position in question.195 Thus, the court
avoided relying on the Democracy Canon simply by determining that the
voters’ intent was unclear, despite there being room for reasonable minds to
disagree about the voters’ intent.
In the one other case citing to section 1-1-103(1), Kuhn v. Williams,196 the
court again avoided liberally interpreting the statute. The court found that a
petition circulator was statutorily ineligible to collect signatures on behalf of
the candidate, so all the signatures he collected could not be counted.197 The
court acknowledged the harsh results:
[The court’s decision] causes the [candidate’s] number of signatures to fall
short of the 1000 required to be on the Republican primary ballot.
Therefore, the Secretary may not certify [the candidate] to the 2018 primary
ballot for [the election]. We recognize the gravity of this conclusion, but
Colorado law does not permit us to conclude otherwise.198

The secretary of state argued that the court was required to liberally construe
the statute that permits judicial review.199 The court rejected this argument,
stating that the liberal construction requirement “is independent from the
issue of whether a protester may challenge the validity of a petition.”200 In
addition, the court noted, a liberal construction of this statute would lead to
an absurd result that the Colorado General Assembly could not have
intended.201
Despite having a codified Democracy Canon, the Colorado Supreme Court
has still managed to disenfranchise voters by refusing to apply a liberal
construction to the election statutes. This may be the result of enacting a
Democracy Canon provision that asks the courts to both protect the right to
vote and prevent fraud.202 However, the court seems less concerned with
fraud (though it is mentioned as a legitimate state interest) and more
concerned with staying within the confines of the statutes’ plain language.203

194. Id. at 1183 (rejecting the ballots “because in each case the voter’s intent cannot be
ascertained with reasonable certainty”).
195. Id. at 1183–84 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
196. 418 P.3d 478 (Colo. 2018).
197. Id. at 480–81.
198. Id. at 489.
199. Id. at 485.
200. Id. at 486.
201. Id. (“[P]ermit[ting] every facially valid petition to proceed, regardless of any
underlying flaws” is an absurd result.).
202. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-1-103(1) (2020).
203. See, e.g., Kuhn, 418 P.3d at 489 (“Colorado law does not permit us to conclude
otherwise.”); Moran v. Carlstrom, 775 P.2d 1176, 1183 (Colo. 1989) (“A commonsense
reading of the statute shows these four ballots are defective within the meaning of [the disputed
statute].”).
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C. Understanding the Longitudinal Analysis
Given this Note’s analysis of these four states, one can make several
assumptions about the Democracy Canon’s use over time. First, even when
these courts have consistently applied the Democracy Canon over time, its
use is more likely to be associated with voter disenfranchisement after 1960
than before. Second, it appears that having a codified Democracy Canon
either currently (Nevada) or historically (Colorado) does not impact this
trend. However, these states do have both more references to the Democracy
Canon204 and more cases resulting in enfranchisement205 than Connecticut
and Arkansas. Thus, it is possible that the codification of the Democracy
Canon had some impact on greater enfranchisement, though other factors
could have played a role in this development.
There are several hypotheses that may account for this shift toward
disenfranchisement, none of which are mutually exclusive nor account for
this trend entirely. First, this decline may be the result of growing distrust in
substantive canons more generally.206 Second, this shift may derive from a
change in the composition of the electorate itself after 1960; with the passage
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,207 voting was made more accessible to
nonwhite voters.208 Perhaps some courts were less willing to invoke the
Democracy Canon if it meant enfranchising African-American voters. A less
accusatory conclusion may be that more election disputes were resolved by
interpreting more recent federal statutes (or the state’s analogue statute), so
justices were less inclined to rely on old precedent interpreting state laws that
invoked the Democracy Canon. Such an explanation might account for the
courts’ (especially Connecticut’s) hesitation to rely on century-old
precedent.209 Lastly, this shift may be a practical result as the number of
election disputes in state courts skyrocketed toward the end of the twentieth
century,210 encouraging courts to seek more precise justifications for their
decisions. With more eyes on election disputes now, courts may be less
willing to rely on the Democracy Canon out of concern for jeopardizing the
judiciary’s legitimacy. To further understand why the Democracy Canon has
become less effective, Part III of this Note explores the reasons underlying
courts’ rejection of the Democracy Canon.

204. The total Democracy Canon references for each state were: Connecticut (17);
Arkansas (11); Nevada (23); and Colorado (24).
205. The total cases resulting in enfranchisement for each state were: Connecticut (5);
Arkansas (6); Nevada (16); and Colorado (16).
206. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.
207. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 and 52 U.S.C.).
208. For an example of how the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has impacted voter
enfranchisement in one state, see Paul Finkelman, The Necessity of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 and the Difficulty of Overcoming Almost a Century of Voting Discrimination, 76 LA. L.
REV. 181, 220–22 (2015).
209. See supra Part II.A.1.
210. See supra note 2.
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III. LATITUDINAL REVIEW OF THE DEMOCRACY CANON
Part III analyzes decisions from the courts of last resort in all fifty states
that have invoked the Democracy Canon since 2000.211
A. Preliminary Results from the Dataset
1. Assembling the Dataset
For Part III, I collected one hundred cases decided since 2000 from thirtyeight states.212 I then categorized these cases in several ways. First, I
determined the type of election dispute involved in the case. Here, I was
more expansive than in Part II213 and included disputes about election
contests themselves and the constitutionality of initiative and recall
petitions.214 The expanded categories of disputes reflect the wider variety of
cases in which judges have decided the Democracy Canon is relevant.
Second, I categorized the cases into three different results: (1) voter
enfranchised; (2) voter disenfranchised; and (3) other.215 Decisions falling
within the “other” category do not clearly result in either the enfranchisement
or disenfranchisement of voters. This includes what I have been referring to
as “split” decisions,216 as well as cases in which the court’s decision could
be seen as enfranchising one general group of voters at the expense of
disenfranchising another group. An example of this is when a candidate has
already been elected but the court orders a new election.217 In these cases,
the court must decide whether to disenfranchise those who already voted or
those who were unable to vote due to the error raised by the plaintiffs.

211. I selected the year 2000 because the presidential election debacle of 2000
fundamentally changed how parties litigate election disputes. See Richard L. Hasen, The
Supreme Court’s Shrinking Election Law Docket, 2001–2010: A Legacy of Bush v. Gore or
Fear of the Roberts Court?, 10 ELECTION L.J. 325, 325–26 (2011) (noting the “explosion” of
election law litigation after Bush v. Gore). On a practical note, limiting the dataset to cases
decided after 2000 provided a manageable, yet informative, set of cases.
212. These cases were collected by searching Westlaw and LexisNexis using the same
Boolean searches and Key Number in note 75 and limiting the results to decisions after
January 1, 2000. Thirteen states had no high court decisions citing to the Democracy Canon
in this time frame. See infra Appendix F.
213. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
214. Cases about the constitutionality of initiative and recall petitions involve a more
specific Democracy Canon: courts should liberally construe constitutional provisions in favor
of the people’s right to petition their government. See, e.g., Ross v. Bennett, 265 P.3d 356,
358 (Ariz. 2011) (“[T]his Court has interpreted constitutional and statutory provisions
governing recall liberally to protect the public’s right to recall its officials.”). However,
because this is a subset of the Democracy Canon and often involves counting or not counting
petition signatures, I have included them in this analysis.
215. See infra Appendix F.
216. See supra note 85.
217. See, e.g., In re Contest of Nov. 8, 2011 Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen. Assembly,
40 A.3d 684, 722 (N.J. 2012) (Rabner, C.J., dissenting) (“To annul the election is to
disenfranchise 19,907 voters and raise questions about whether their constitutional right to
vote has been denied.”).
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Another example is when an election has been erroneously conducted and
may have resulted in voter confusion or misconduct at the polls.218
There are some caveats about this dataset. To begin, this may not be a full
survey of all instances in which the Democracy Canon has been invoked
since 2000 in the highest court of every state, though I included every
decision I found that falls within the relevant categories of
disenfranchisement.219 Additionally, because this set of cases is limited to
election disputes that explicitly mention a liberal construction in favor of
enfranchisement, this analysis does not purport to reflect a greater trend in
state election dispute results. Instead, the data is meant only to highlight how
courts are now employing the Democracy Canon. Lastly, this dataset does
not show that the Democracy Canon is less useful in protecting the right to
vote than it has been historically (as was the analysis in Part II). Building on
the observations made in Part II, this Part provides a universe of cases that is
helpful in considering why courts in the twenty-first century are
disenfranchising voters despite referencing the Democracy Canon, which is
meant to protect enfranchisement.
2. Initial Results
Of the one hundred cases in this dataset, forty-nine of the cases resulted in
the enfranchisement of voters, forty-one resulted in disenfranchisement, and
ten resulted in other results.220 In broad strokes, reference to the Democracy
Canon is almost as likely to result in voter disenfranchisement as it is to
enfranchise voters. This suggests that the Democracy Canon is not a
powerful instrument for protecting the right to vote, and it is a mistake to
assume that courts will enfranchise voters if the judges mention the Canon.
Another intriguing result is that the enfranchisement/disenfranchisement
split is just as pronounced in states where the Democracy Canon has been
codified by the state legislature: the twenty-six decisions in this category
were equally split between enfranchisement and disenfranchisement (twelve
each), with the remaining two cases falling into the other category.221 This
category had the highest rate of disenfranchisement (46 percent) of all three
categories.222 In addition, most of the decisions in this category do not have
any citations to their codified Democracy Canon provision.223 However, the
state court decisions that do cite to these provisions often enfranchise
218. E.g., Wesley v. Wash. Cty. Democratic Exec. Comm., 235 So. 3d 1379, 1386–87
(Miss. 2017) (refusing to order a new election when the security of ballot boxes allegedly
called all votes into question).
219. This dataset only includes cases in which some variation of the terms “liberal,”
“strict,” “construe,” or “construction” appear in the opinion; if courts refer to the Democracy
Canon using other language, it will not appear in this dataset.
220. See infra Appendix G.
221. See infra Appendix G.
222. See infra Appendix G.
223. Though there are twenty-six cases from this category of states that were decided after
2000, there are only seven cases that cite to the codified Democracy Canon provision after
2000. Compare infra Appendix G, with infra Appendix H.
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voters.224 Though the presented dataset cannot provide a reason for this
trend, one hypothesis is that state courts are hesitant to confine themselves to
codified rules of construction.225 It could also be that these states generally
have more codified canons of statutory interpretation, so justices have greater
leeway in choosing which canons to rely on. Regardless, the analysis of these
decisions suggests that the mere existence of a codified Democracy Canon
provision does not generally impact a court’s decision. But when a court
relies on the codified Democracy Canon provision by explicitly citing to it,
the chances of enfranchisement increase dramatically.
B. Trends from the Dataset
Because the invocation of the Democracy Canon, generally, is almost as
likely to be associated with disenfranchisement as it is with enfranchisement,
it is important to understand what might explain these results. If a court
purports to construe statutes in favor of the right to vote, how does it still
disenfranchise voters? To answer this question, this Part examines decisions
in the dataset that either disenfranchise voters despite reference to the
Democracy Canon or enfranchise voters with a dissenting opinion that
critiques the court’s use of the Democracy Canon.226 These discussions
provide a fruitful ground for understanding how the Democracy Canon is
subject to judicial discretion and what other interpretive canons might sway
a court to disenfranchise voters. Understanding state courts’ reactions to the
Democracy Canon can shine light on how attorneys and state legislatures
should approach using the Canon.
1. The Rise of Textualism
Some courts arguing against the legitimacy of the Democracy Canon do
so by adopting a method of statutory interpretation akin to Gluck’s “modified
textualism.”227 In short, Gluck identifies a new trend in state courts that
differs from traditional textualism in that it offers a tiered approach to
interpretation that “emphasizes textual analysis (step one); limits the use of
legislative history (only in step two, and only if textual analysis alone does
not suffice); and dramatically reduces reliance on the oft-used policy
presumptions, the ‘substantive canons’ of interpretation (only in step three,
and only if all else fails).”228
Indeed, most of the cases rejecting the Democracy Canon do so because
the plain language of the statute is clear and thus no further interpretation is

224. Of the seven cases that cite to a codified Democracy Canon provision after 2000, six
of them led to enfranchisement. See infra Appendix H.
225. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1824–25.
226. There are forty-eight cases that fall within this subset. See infra Appendix F.
227. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1834–42 (noting the differences between modified
textualism and traditional textualism).
228. Id. at 1758.
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necessary.229 Often, this involves determining whether the statutory
language is mandatory or directory. Typical in this regard is the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 2004 decision In re Canvass of Absentee
Ballots of Nov. 4, 2003 General Election.230 The court had to decide whether
absentee ballots delivered by third parties on behalf of nondisabled voters are
valid votes that should be counted.231 The relevant statute, section 3146.6 of
the Pennsylvania Election Code, states that “the elector shall send [the
absentee ballot] by mail, postage prepaid, except where franked, or deliver it
in person to said county board of election.”232 The appellate court counted
the seventy-four absentee ballots because the voters had submitted their
ballots via third parties in reliance on instructions from the board of elections,
even though “those instructions violated the plain language of the Election
Code.”233 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and voided
the ballots after finding that “shall” in the statute “carries an imperative or
mandatory meaning.”234 Appellees referenced the court’s precedent, urging
that the election code be liberally construed, so that “shall” should be
understood as directory rather than mandatory.235 The court rejected this
argument, noting that the cases relied on by appellees were decided before
the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Statutory Construction Act of 1972,
“which dictates that legislative intent is to be considered only when a statute
is ambiguous.”236 Though acknowledging that “some contexts may leave the
precise meaning of the word ‘shall’ in doubt,” the court nevertheless found
the term “shall” to be unambiguous and refused to liberally construe the
statute.237 By finding the plain language to be unambiguous, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court disenfranchised voters who simply relied on
instructions from election officials.

229. See, e.g., State ex rel. Schmidt v. City of Wichita, 367 P.3d 282, 293–94 (Kan. 2016)
(rejecting the Democracy Canon because the statute was not ambiguous); Becker v. Dean, 854
So. 2d 864, 873 (La. 2003) (Weimer, J., dissenting) (noting that “promoting candidacy is
unquestionably a laudable goal” but “[u]nderlying policy cannot supercede the clear language
of the law”); Doe v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 962 A.2d 342, 362–63 (Md. 2008)
(same); Abrams v. Lamone, 919 A.2d 1223, 1243 (Md. 2007) (finding the Democracy Canon
inappropriate because the court has “construed eligibility requirements strictly, where the
language of the constitutional provision is clear”); Pony Lake Sch. Dist. 30 v. State Comm.
for the Reorganization of Sch. Dists., 710 N.W.2d 609, 621 (Neb. 2006) (“[R]ule[s] of
construction cannot authorize this court to expand the right of referendum beyond what has
been reserved or to ignore its plain limitations.”); Ohio Renal Ass’n v. Kidney Dialysis Patient
Prot. Amendment Comm., 111 N.E.3d 1139, 1145 (Ohio 2018) (The rule that an unambiguous
statute is to be applied, not interpreted, “applies with particular force in this election case.”);
Cathcart v. Meyer, 88 P.3d 1050, 1068 (Wyo. 2004) (rejecting the Democracy Canon because
“construction, liberal or otherwise, of unambiguous provisions is not only unnecessary, but is
unwarranted”).
230. 843 A.2d 1223 (Pa. 2004).
231. Id. at 1225.
232. Id. at 1226.
233. Id. at 1229.
234. Id. at 1231.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1231–32.
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Even if a court finds ambiguity in the statute’s language, justices
employing a method of interpretation similar to Gluck’s modified textualism
hierarchy will only rely on substantive canons, like the Democracy Canon,
as a last resort.238 Courts rejecting a liberal construction of the election
statute in question do just this, relying on everything from dictionaries239 to
legislative history240 to avoid employing the Democracy Canon. The rising
popularity of modified textualism in state courts may explain in part the
hesitancy to rely on the Democracy Canon to enfranchise voters.
Additionally, Part II of this Note showed that the supreme courts of
Connecticut, Nevada, and Colorado are less willing now to rely on the
Democracy Canon to overcome the plain language of a statute than before
1960.241 A court, regardless of statutory interpretation method, can easily
avoid employing the Democracy Canon if the court finds the language to be
unambiguous.
2. Balancing Other State Interests
Courts have acknowledged a number of state interests that may outweigh
the interest of protecting enfranchisement. For instance, in recall petition
disputes, courts have found that the state’s interest in having rare recalls (to
ensure stability and save costs) can outweigh the citizen’s right to recall.242
Another idea courts emphasize is the interest in maintaining a uniform
election code.243
The most important state interest that courts are willing to uphold is the
prevention of fraud.244 Hasen acknowledges that courts may not rely on the
238. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1824–25.
239. See, e.g., Keeley v. Ayala, 179 A.3d 1249, 1262 (Conn. 2018) (defining “designate”);
Butts v. Bysiewicz, 5 A.3d 932, 941 (Conn. 2010) (defining “invalid”); Becker v. Dean, 854
So. 2d 864, 874 (La. 2003) (Weimer, J., dissenting) (defining “actually”); Kucera v. Bradbury,
97 P.3d 1191, 1201 (Or. 2004) (defining “certify”); In re Contest of 2003 Gen. Election for
the Office of Prothonotary, 849 A.2d 230, 238 (Pa. 2004) (defining “oath”).
240. See, e.g., Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Nevadans for Sound Gov’t, 100 P.3d 179, 194
(Nev. 2004) (A review of the legislative history removes ambiguity of the term “occupied” in
the election statute.); Panio v. Sunderland, 824 N.E.2d 488, 493 (N.Y. 2005) (Read, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the statute’s legislative history does not support the majority’s
Democracy Canon argument).
241. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1–2.
242. See Strickland v. Waymire, 235 P.3d 605, 612 (Nev. 2010); Citizens for Honest &
Responsible Gov’t v. Heller, 11 P.3d 121, 127 (Nev. 2000).
243. See Republican Party of Garland Cty. v. Johnson, 193 S.W.3d 248, 252 (Ark. 2004)
(“[S]trict observance of statutory requirements is essential . . . as it is desirable that election
results have a degree of stability and finality.”); Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer, 659 N.W.2d 724,
730 (Minn. 2003) (“[I]t is this paramount importance of the right to vote that imbues the state
with a compelling interest in preserving the orderliness and integrity of the election process.”);
Kucera v. Bradbury, 97 P.3d 1191, 1202 (Or. 2004) (deferring to the secretary’s duty “to
obtain and maintain uniformity in the application, operation and interpretation of the election
laws”).
244. See, e.g., Peroutka v. Cronin, 179 P.3d 1050, 1057 (Haw. 2008) (rejecting the
candidate’s petition signatures “[i]n light of the state’s interest in detecting fraudulent or
questionable signatures”); Doe v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 962 A.2d 342, 363 (Md.
2008) (rejecting a liberal construction of statute to avoid effectively eliminating additional
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Democracy Canon when there are serious allegations of fraud.245 However,
courts have refused to employ the Democracy Canon even where there is a
complete absence of fraud or intentional misconduct.246 For instance, the
New York Court of Appeals voided all absentee ballots that were incorrectly
submitted due to an election official’s error, not the wrongdoing of the
voters.247 In responding to the dissent’s invocation of the Democracy Canon,
the court held that the Democracy Canon could not be invoked even when
voters were innocent of wrongdoing because “an exception predicated on
voter innocence would swallow the rule, effectively relieving election
officials of their obligation to adhere to the law.”248 Strict compliance with
the election statutes, even if noncompliance was not the fault of the voter, is
necessary because “a too-liberal construction . . . has the potential for
inviting mischief on the part of candidates, or their supporters or aides, or
worse still, manipulations of the entire election process.”249
Even when fraud prevention is a valid concern in an election dispute,
courts differ in understanding what their role is in upholding the state’s
interest of fraud prevention in relation to the Democracy Canon. Some courts
will invoke the Democracy Canon so long as it does not trample on the state’s
interest in preventing fraudulent elections.250 Under this view, the court has
some discretion as to whether strict compliance with an election statute
would compromise concerns about fraudulent voting.251
Other courts conceptualize the enforcement of fraud prevention
regulations as being quintessential to the right to vote, making the
Democracy Canon unnecessary. For example, in cases regarding the
constitutionality of voter identification requirements, courts accepting the
identification laws see the requirement as a method of fraud prevention that

preventions against fraud); In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of Nov. 4, 2003 Gen. Election,
843 A.2d 1223, 1232–33 (Pa. 2004) (“To ignore [the statute’s] clear instructions regarding inperson delivery would undermine the statute’s very purpose as a safeguard against fraud.”).
But see Panio, 824 N.E.2d at 490 (relying on the Democracy Canon because the risk of fraud
is less present in affidavit voting as opposed to absentee voting).
245. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 84.
246. See, e.g., Keeley v. Ayala, 179 A.3d 1249, 1261 (Conn. 2018) (“[T]he return of ballots
in a manner not substantially in compliance with [statute] will result in their invalidation,
regardless of whether there is any proof of fraud.”); Gross v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections,
819 N.E.2d 197, 202 (N.Y. 2004).
247. See Gross, 819 N.E.2d at 202.
248. Id. at 203.
249. Id. at 201 (quoting Stabler v. Fidler, 482 N.E.2d 1204, 1205 (N.Y. 1985)).
250. See, e.g., Adkins v. Huckabay, 755 So. 2d 206, 221 (La. 2000) (A court will liberally
construe a statute “to the extent that such tolerance of the irregularities will not lead to a
manipulation of an election or affect the integrity of an election or the sanctity of the ballot.”);
In re Contest of 2003 Gen. Election for the Office of Prothonotary, 849 A.2d 230, 237 (Pa.
2004) (“[T]he policy of the liberal reading of the Election Code cannot be distorted to
emasculate those requirements necessary to assure the probity of the process.” (quoting In re
Cianfrani, 359 A.2d 383, 384 (Pa. 1976))).
251. See, e.g., Panio v. Sunderland, 824 N.E.2d 488, 491 (N.Y. 2005) (finding that the risk
of fraud was less important when election error was the result of ministerial error).
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does not unreasonably interfere with the right to vote.252 By preventing
fraudulent voting, these laws “preserve the purity of elections” by
“preventing lawful voters from having their votes diluted by those cast by
fraudulent voters.”253 Whether or not a court takes such a strong stance on
fraud prevention, it is clear that some courts simply believe that fraud
prevention should be prioritized over broader enfranchisement.
3. Judicial Deference to Legislative Prerogatives
Courts have suggested that employment of the Democracy Canon
exemplifies a lack of judicial restraint.254 Many courts acknowledge that the
outcomes of cases disenfranchising voters are unsavory but that such
decisions fall outside the judicial scope of power.255 The courts reach this
conclusion by acknowledging that election statutes are the compromised
result of balancing the promotion of enfranchisement with “ensur[ing] the
integrity of the election process.”256 Thus, courts will avoid a liberal
construction of an election statute out of concern that such an interpretation
would upset the legislature’s policymaking decision.257
To not upset the legislature’s policymaking, courts must make certain
assumptions about the legislature’s intent. One of these assumptions is that
the legislature intends to avoid absurd results when drafting legislation.258
252. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 851
N.W.2d 302, 306 (Wis. 2014) (“[P]hoto identification is a reasonable regulation that could
improve and modernize election procedures, safeguard voter confidence in the outcome of
elections and deter voter fraud.”).
253. In re Request for Advisory Op. Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740
N.W.2d 444, 448 (Mich. 2007); see also League of Women Voters of Wis., 851 N.W.2d at 315
(Voter identification law “promote[s] the right to vote by assuring that a constitutionally
qualified elector’s vote counts with full force and is not offset by illegal ballots.”).
254. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 937 A.2d 13, 22 (Conn. 2007) (finding that the
Democracy Canon “does not authorize the court to substitute its views for those of the
legislature”); Taylor v. Cent. City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 733 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Iowa 2007) (“Our
legislature has established certain basic voting requirements that we are obligated to enforce
in the absence of a successful constitutional challenge to the statute.”).
255. See, e.g., Coleman v. Ritchie, 762 N.W.2d 218, 230 (Minn. 2009) (refusing to count
absentee ballots even though “a more flexible process might be advisable as a matter of policy
[but] that is for the legislature to decide”); State ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 900 N.E.2d 982,
990 (Ohio 2008) (The Democracy Canon “does not allow [the court] to simply ignore facts
and make unreasonable assumptions.”); Shambach v. Bickhart, 845 A.2d 793, 808 (Pa. 2004)
(Castille, J., dissenting) (dissenting because the court “do[es] not possess a free-ranging power
to strike down legislation that [it] finds contrary to amorphous ‘principles of democracy’”).
256. Butts v. Bysiewicz, 5 A.3d 932, 939 (Conn. 2010); see also Shambach, 845 A.2d at
813 (Castille, J., dissenting) (A court’s “task is to strike the proper balance between protecting
the elective franchise and enforcing the salutary directives of the Code” unless the statute’s
language is clear.).
257. See, e.g., Comm. to Recall Robert Mendez from the Office of U.S. Senator v. Wells,
7 A.3d 720, 749–50 (N.J. 2010) (“We cannot resolve the policy debate over recall” in part
because that “can only be achieved through the amendment process.”); see also League of
Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie, 819 N.W.2d 636, 651 (Minn. 2012) (Courts should not
“second-guess the wisdom of policy decisions that the constitution commits to one of the
political branches.”).
258. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 21, at 673–74 (defining the canon of avoiding absurd
results).
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Courts often refuse to employ the Democracy Canon if such a construction
will lead to an absurd result.259 For example, the Missouri Supreme Court
avoided a liberal construction of the residency requirement for a judicial
candidate in Lewis v. Gibbons.260 The statute in question required the
candidate to reside in the county where he or she was seeking election for “at
least one year prior to the date of his [or her] election.”261 Gibbons, the
challenged candidate, argued for a liberal construction of the statute so that
his residency in the county for a year after college, but not the immediately
preceding year, would be sufficient to meet the residency requirement.262
The majority believed that such an interpretation was an absurd result since
it “would permit a person to live in a county between the age of birth and 18
months, to leave the county and to return 50 or 60 years later and be eligible
to run.”263 Judge Michael Wolff, in dissent, did not necessarily disagree with
the absurd result of this interpretation but nevertheless felt Gibbons was
eligible: “Incumbent-protection laws, such as the one at issue here, often are
inherently absurd. If the reading that I advocate seems absurd, it may be
precisely what this statute deserves.”264
Another canon that courts invoking the Democracy Canon will
simultaneously refer to is the constitutional avoidance canon.265 The two
substantive canons are clearly related: if the state’s constitution guarantees
the right to vote, then interpreting a statute to avoid an unconstitutional
reading would avoid an interpretation that would infringe on the right to
vote.266 However, there are some who believe that these two canons do not
work in tandem. At least one judge concerned about infringing on the
legislature’s role has understood the constitutional avoidance canon to be just
as problematic as the Democracy Canon. Justice Ronald Castille’s dissent in
259. See, e.g., Doe v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 962 A.2d 342, 363 n.28 (Md.
2008) (Interpreting “shall” as “anything other than mandatory” would lead to absurd results.);
Abrams v. Lamone, 919 A.2d 1223, 1248 (Md. 2007) (The broad interpretation of eligibility
requirements is “absurd or unworkable.”); City of North Platte v. Tilgner, 803 N.W.2d 469,
481 (Neb. 2011) (determining that a liberal construction leads to an absurd result because it
would shield all taxation measures from referendum); In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of
Nov. 4, 2003 Gen. Election, 843 A.2d 1223, 1232 (Pa. 2004) (“To construe [the statute] as
merely directory would render its limitation meaningless and, ultimately, absurd.”). But see
Populist Party of Ark. v. Chesterfield, 195 S.W.3d 354, 359 (Ark. 2004) (holding that not
construing the statute liberally would lead to an absurd result); Weinschenk v. State, 203
S.W.3d 201, 225 (Mo. 2006) (Limbaugh, J., dissenting) (same).
260. 80 S.W.3d 461 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
261. Id. at 463–64.
262. Id. at 464.
263. Id. at 466.
264. Id. at 471 (Wolff, J., dissenting).
265. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 21, at 725–29 (discussing the constitutional
avoidance canon).
266. See, e.g., Populist Party of Ark. v. Chesterfield, 195 S.W.3d 354, 359 (Ark. 2004)
(rejecting the lower court’s interpretation that denied the candidate access because such
interpretation “infringes upon one of the fundamental civil liberties of our democracy, that of
the secret ballot”); Comm. to Recall Robert Mendez from the Office of U.S. Senator v. Wells,
7 A.3d 720, 760 (N.J. 2010) (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting) (“[T]he principle commanding that
we avoid a constitutional question . . . authoritatively counsels that we . . . stay our hand and
allow the recall process to go forward.”).
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Shambach v. Bickhart,267 rejecting the majority’s use of the Democracy
Canon, invoked constitutional avoidance as an example of “salutary
principles requiring judicial restraint.”268 Even if employing the Democracy
Canon would mean avoiding unconstitutional interpretations, some courts
may still not be willing to rely on the Canon because such a practice falls
outside the scope of the judicial function and infringes on the legislature’s
role.
IV. THE LIMITATIONS AND BENEFITS OF CODIFYING THE DEMOCRACY
CANON AND OTHER SUBSTANTIVE CANONS
The datasets in Parts II and III highlight three trends in state court
references to the Democracy Canon. First, in at least four states, invocation
of the Democracy Canon is less likely to be associated with the
enfranchisement of citizens today than it was in the first half of the twentieth
century.269 Second, codification of the Democracy Canon does not stop this
trend toward disenfranchisement, though it may mitigate the trend’s
effects.270 Lastly, courts invoking the Democracy Canon in the twenty-first
century have been almost as likely to disenfranchise voters as they are to
enfranchise them.271 All three trends seem to point to one conclusion: in
practice, the Democracy Canon is no longer effective.
This analysis reinforces some of the fears about the Democracy Canon that
scholars have raised.272 Its use is scattered and leads to unpredictable results,
with enfranchisement and disenfranchisement being almost equally as likely
when a state court references the Democracy Canon.273 Further, the reasons
courts give for rejecting the Democracy Canon mirror scholarly concerns
about the Canon. The courts cite to concerns about encroaching on the
legislature’s power either by veering from a statute’s plain meaning274 or
undertaking policymaking decisions,275 both of which derive from concerns
about disrupting the legislative process.276 Other courts take the opposite
267. 845 A.2d 793 (Pa. 2004).
268. Id. at 808 (Castille, J., dissenting).
269. See supra Part II.
270. See supra Part II.B. Though the overall trend in Nevada and Colorado was toward
disenfranchisement, there were still more cases resulting in enfranchisement than in
Connecticut and Arkansas. See supra notes 204–05. Perhaps the presence of a codified
Democracy Canon provision at least made it harder for courts to justify disenfranchising
voters.
271. See supra Part III.A.1.
272. See supra notes 57–62.
273. This supports concerns raised by Levitt, as well as more general concerns about the
inconsistent results of substantive canons. See Levitt, supra note 59, at 155; see also supra
note 40.
274. See supra Part III.B.1.
275. See supra Part III.B.3.
276. See Elmendorf, supra note 60, at 1064–65 (“If [conservative legislators] knew that
there was a special ‘pro voter’ canon of interpretation that could be trotted out by liberal judges
to construe the inevitable imperfections of legislative drafting in a manner that undermines the
legislative deal, they would fight tooth and nail against bills that even modestly liberalize the
terms of voter participation . . . .”); Flanders, supra note 58, at 1373 (“When election statutes
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approach, embracing the chance to make the choice between voting integrity
and voter access,277 a policy choice that theoretically should make critics of
substantive canons shiver. Thus, it seems as if these courts reject the
Democracy Canon out of either fear of or total disregard for the concerns
regarding substantive canons.
Richard Hasen believes that these dangers “should [not be met] with a
jettisoning of the Democracy Canon.”278 Despite the unpredictable results
the Democracy Canon yields, I agree with Professor Hasen. Yet there must
be a way to make the Democracy Canon more effective, to ensure that
judicial interpretation of statutes does not infringe on the right to vote.
Codification of the Democracy Canon is still the best way to ensure that
statutory interpretation of election laws does not lead to disenfranchisement
of voters. To be sure, codification is not foolproof. This dataset supports
Abbe Gluck’s insight that state high courts will work around or simply ignore
codified rules of construction.279 Of the fourteen states with a codified
Democracy Canon, only half cited to the Democracy Canon provision.280 In
addition, most citations to the codified Democracy Canon provisions are
from before 2000.281 However, of the twenty-three cases that did cite to the
Democracy Canon provision, only four led to disenfranchisement (a rate of
about 17 percent).282 Though the results of the Democracy Canon are still
unpredictable, the uncertainty decreases when the court invokes the
Democracy Canon provision, as opposed to the Democracy Canon at
common law.
Even if this limited information on states with codified Democracy Canons
is not sufficiently convincing, on a theoretical level, codification of the
Democracy Canon should assuage the fears outlined by courts in justifying
their rejection of the Democracy Canon. For courts that fear infringing on
the legislature’s power, codification of the Democracy Canon makes these
concerns moot. Some see the Democracy Canon (and substantive canons
more generally) as undermining the legislative process itself.283 Codification
of the Democracy Canon, however, legislatively legitimizes it. When a
legislature enacts a provision urging the judiciary to employ a value-driven
rule (e.g., “access to voting deserves protection”), it is affirmatively
prioritizing the value of the rule over the risk of inconsistent application.284
have been drafted in a nonpartisan way, the court should respect the outcome of the democratic
legislative process.”).
277. See supra Part III.B.2.
278. Hasen, supra note 2, at 106.
279. See, e.g., supra Part II.A.1.
280. See infra Appendix H. The states that did not cite at all to their Democracy Canon
provisions were California, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, and Vermont.
281. See infra Appendix H (Of the twenty-three cases citing to the Democracy Canon
provisions, sixteen were decided before 2000.).
282. See infra Appendix H. The states that cited to their Democracy Canon provisions
were Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin.
283. See Flanders, supra note 58, at 1373; see also supra note 47.
284. See Scott, supra note 25, at 405 (“[I]t is hard to say that interpreters can ignore
[codified canons] where that permission has been democratically granted.”).
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In other words, how can Democracy Canon discretion infringe on the
legislative power when the legislature instructs the courts to use such
discretion? Legislatures can further bolster the codified Democracy Canon
by enacting a general Democracy Canon provision but noting that certain
provisions of the election code are exceptions to the general Democracy
Canon provision and should be strictly construed.285 This practice would
assure the judiciary that, based on the whole election code, the legislature has
been explicit about which provisions it intended to be strictly enforced and
which provisions are open to a liberal construction.286
For courts that rejected the Democracy Canon to prioritize other state
interests (like fraud prevention), codification of the Canon can inform the
courts which interests the legislature considers the most important. With a
codified Democracy Canon provision, courts will find it harder to justify
other interests over those explicitly mentioned by the legislature. This is
especially effective if a legislature enacts a statute explicitly stating that
voting accessibility is a more important state interest than the prevention of
fraud.287 This solution is clearly not perfect: not only would it be difficult
to enact such a provision but judges would still be capable of working around
this plain language.288 However, providing such explicit instructions would
make it more difficult for courts to hide behind the veil of fraud prevention.
The solution of codification is not limited to the Democracy Canon. At
the state level, there has been an expansive codification of statutory rules of
construction. This provides a unique opportunity to reconsider critiques of
substantive canons that are less viable once state legislatures codify the
canons. If courts and scholars are willing to give weight to their criticisms
of substantive canons, those criticisms must withstand the codification of the
substantive canons by a legislature.289 Enactment of a substantive canon
eliminates concerns about judicial interpretations undermining the legislative
process290 because enactment of the codified substantive canon is now itself
the result of compromise-based legislation. Unpredictability in the results of
substantive canons291 also is less of a concern after codification, as the
legislature has expressed its belief that the need for judicial discretion is
worth the risks of uncertainty in application when certain issues are involved
285. Richard Hasen makes this suggestion as well. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 122 (“A
legislature worried about judicial overreaching could pass election statutes that not only
clearly state their mandatory and non-waivable nature, but also indicate that such statutes
should be strictly construed against expansive voter rights.”).
286. An example of this would be Colorado’s election code, which Hasen relies on to
rebuke some of Elmendorf’s claims. See Hasen, supra note 62, at 1180.
287. An example of this statute is Nevada’s section 293.127. See supra note 151. All of
the Nevada Supreme Court’s cases citing to this provision resulted in the enfranchisement of
the voters. However, this statute is not entirely effective, as the Nevada Supreme Court still
decided four other cases since 2000 that did not cite to this provision and resulted in
disenfranchisement.
288. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
289. There is still a question of whether legislatures even have the authority to enact rules
of construction. See supra note 28. However, this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
290. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 40.
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(like voting rights). Finally, when state legislatures codify substantive
canons, statutory interpretation can be better understood as interbranch
dialogue, which can lead to a cooperative and more accurate understanding
of what the law is.292 State courts (as well as scholars) should be open to
reconsidering substantive canons when they are codified by the state
legislature as a rule of construction. By reconceptualizing the codified rules
of construction as interbranch dialogue, both branches can work in tandem
to ensure that voters, not judges, determine the outcomes of our elections.
CONCLUSION
The Democracy Canon could be (and has been) a powerful tool for courts
to safeguard our right to vote. However, as this Note has shown, the impact
of this Canon, particularly over the past half-century, has been inadequate, if
not outright detrimental. If state courts are unwilling to use the Canon, then
the task of protecting the right to vote must fall on the legislatures’ shoulders.
Codification of the Democracy Canon, and other substantive canons,
undermines the courts’ concerns about invoking a common-law substantive
canon. Once a substantive canon is codified, courts and scholars will have
to reconsider their well-established critiques of substantive canons.
Yet this exercise is not just about recharacterizing scholarly debate. While
the data on the Democracy Canon may seem inconsequential within the
bigger picture of election law, it demonstrates how state courts may operate
to either enhance or limit individual rights, like the right to vote. More
importantly, shedding light on how courts can circumvent substantive canons
like the Democracy Canon can help litigants and lawmakers alike frame their
arguments to confront these challenges when fighting for our right to vote.

292. See Brudney & Leib, supra note 31, at 390 (Interbranch dialogue “supports
institutions’ appropriate humility, leverages their comparative institutional competence, and
harnesses the benefits of deliberative engagement on matters of law and policy.”).
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APPENDIX A
Categorization of Democracy Canon Statutes
Category 1: Democracy
Canon Codified

Category 2: Rejection or
Disregard of Democracy
Canon

Applicable
to All
Election
Provisions

Applicable to
Specific
Election
Provisions

No Rule to
Liberally
Construe Statute

Nebraska
Nevada
Oregon
Wisconsin

California
Iowa
Kansas
Massachusetts
New Jersey
New York
South Carolina
South Dakota
Utah
Vermont

Alabama
Alaska
Indiana
Maine
Michigan
Mississippi
New Hampshire
North Carolina
Virginia
West Virginia

Other
Incompatible
Rules of
Construction
Connecticut
Louisiana
New Mexico
Rhode Island

Category 3: Semi–
Democracy Canon
Codified
General
States That
Rule to
Appear in
Liberally
Both
Construe
Categories 1
Statutes
and 2
Arizona
Arkansas
Illinois
Kentucky
Missouri
Montana
Ohio
Oklahoma
Washington

Colorado
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Maryland
Minnesota
North Dakota
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Texas
Wyoming
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APPENDIX B
Connecticut Democracy Canon Cases
Case
Talcott v. Philbrick,
20 A. 436 (Conn. 1890)
Fields v. Osborne,
21 A. 1070 (Conn. 1891)
State ex rel. Phelan v. Walsh,
25 A. 1 (Conn. 1892)
Fessenden v. Bossa,
37 A. 977 (Conn. 1897)
Coughlin v. McElroy,
43 A. 854 (Conn. 1899)

Type of Dispute

Result

Reference to
Democracy Canon

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Dissent (followed)

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Vote counting

Split

Majority (followed)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Merrill v. Reed,
52 A. 409 (Conn. 1902)
Flanagan v. Hynes,
54 A. 737 (Conn. 1903)
Denny v. Pratt,
135 A. 40 (Conn. 1926)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Candidate access

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Scully v. Town of Westport,
145 A.2d 742 (Conn. 1958)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Vote counting

Split

Majority (followed and
rejected); concurrence
(followed)

Candidate access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Candidate access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Candidate access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Hurlbut v. Lemelin,
230 A.2d 36 (Conn. 1967)
Dombkowski v. Messier,
319 A.2d 373 (Conn. 1972)
Wrinn v. Dunleavy,
440 A.2d 261 (Conn. 1982)
In re Election of U.S.
Representative for Second Cong.
Dist., 653 A.2d 79 (Conn. 1994)
Gonzalez v. Surgeon,
937 A.2d 13 (Conn. 2007)
Bysiewicz v. Dinardo,
6 A.3d 726 (Conn. 2010)
Butts v. Bysiewicz,
5 A.3d 932 (Conn. 2010)
Keeley v. Ayala,
179 A.3d 1249 (Conn. 2018)
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APPENDIX C
Arkansas Democracy Canon Cases
Case
Logan v. Russell,
206 S.W. 131 (Ark. 1918)
Cain v. Carl-Lee,
269 S.W. 57 (Ark. 1925)
Robinson v. Knowlton,
40 S.W.2d 450 (Ark. 1931)
La Fargue v. Waggoner,
75 S.W.2d 235 (Ark. 1934)
Phillips v. Rothrock,
110 S.W.2d 26 (Ark. 1937)
Horne v. Fish,
127 S.W.2d 623 (Ark. 1939)
Fisher v. Taylor,
196 S.W.2d 217 (Ark. 1946)
Gunter v. Fletcher,
233 S.W.2d 242 (Ark. 1950)
Reed v. Baker,
495 S.W.2d 849 (Ark. 1973)
Republican Party of Garland
Cty. v. Johnson,
193 S.W.3d 248 (Ark. 2004)
Populist Party of Ark. v.
Chesterfield, 195 S.W.3d 354
(Ark. 2004)

Type of Dispute

Result

Reference to
Democracy Canon

Election contest

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Dissent (followed)

Election contest

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Election contest

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Initiative

Disenfranchised

Dissent (followed)

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Candidate access

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Election contest

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Election contest

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Candidate access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Candidate access

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)
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APPENDIX D
Nevada Democracy Canon Cases
Case
Stinson v. Sweeney,
30 P. 997 (Nev. 1883)
State ex rel. Galusha v. Davis,
19 P. 894 (Nev. 1888)
Buckner v. Lynip,
41 P. 762 (Nev. 1895)
Dennis v. Caughlin,
41 P. 768 (Nev. 1895)
State ex rel. McMillan v. Sadler,
58 P. 284 (Nev. 1899)
State ex rel. Kaufman v. Martin,
106 P. 318 (Nev. 1910)
In re Primary Ballots,
126 P. 643 (Nev. 1910)
Nicholson v. Commins,
111 P. 289 (Nev. 1910)
Turner v. Fogg,
159 P. 56 (Nev. 1916)
State ex rel. Morton v. Howard,
248 P. 44 (Nev. 1926)
State ex rel. Matzdorf v. Scott,
285 P. 511 (Nev. 1930)
Gilbert v. Breithaupt,
104 P.2d 183 (Nev. 1940)
Lundberg v. Koontz,
418 P.2d 808 (Nev. 1966)
Long v. Swackhamer,
538 P.2d 587 (Nev. 1975)
LaPorta v. Broadbent,
530 P.2d 1404 (Nev. 1975)
Cleland v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 552 P.2d 488 (Nev. 1976)
Cirac v. Lander County,
602 P.2d 1012 (Nev. 1979)
State Emps. Ass’n v. Lau,
877 P.2d 531 (Nev. 1994)

Type of Dispute

Result

Reference to
Democracy Canon

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Initiative petition

Disenfranchised

Dissent (followed)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed);
dissent (rejected)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Candidate access

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Registration

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Initiative petition

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Recall petition

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Candidate access

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Initiative petition

Disenfranchised

Dissent (followed)

Candidate access

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed);
dissent (rejected)

Initiative petition

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Initiative petition

Enfranchised

Majority (followed);
dissent (rejected)

Candidate access

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

2020]
Citizens for Honest &
Responsible Gov’t v. Heller,
11 P.3d 121 (Nev. 2000)
Rogers v. Heller,
18 P.3d 1034 (Nev. 2001)
Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v.
Nevadans for Sound Gov’t,
100 P.3d 179 (Nev. 2004)
Miller v. Burk,
188 P.3d 1112 (Nev. 2008)
Strickland v. Waymire,
235 P.3d 605 (Nev. 2010)

THE DEMOCRACY CANON

1997

Recall petition

Disenfranchised

Majority (mentioned)

Initiative petition

Disenfranchised

Dissent (followed)

Initiative petition

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Candidate access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Initiative petition

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

1998
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APPENDIX E
Colorado Democracy Canon Cases
Case
Kellogg v. Hickman,
21 P. 325 (Colo. 1889)
Allen v. Glynn,
29 P. 670 (Colo. 1892)
Young v. Simpson,
42 P. 666 (Colo. 1895)
Dickinson v. Freed,
55 P. 812 (Colo. 1898)
Nicholls v. Barrick,
62 P. 202 (Colo. 1900)
People ex rel. Johnson v. Earl,
94 P. 294 (Colo. 1908)
Littlejohn v. People ex rel.
Desch, 121 P. 159 (Colo. 1912)
Pease v. Wilkin,
127 P. 230 (Colo. 1912)
Benson v. Gillespie,
161 P. 295 (Colo. 1916)
Stephen v. Lail,
248 P. 1012 (Colo. 1926)
City of Aspen v. Howell,
459 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1969)
Colo. Project–Common Cause v.
Anderson, 495 P.2d 220 (Colo.
1972)
Meyer v. Putnam,
526 P.2d 139 (Colo. 1974)
Chesser v. Buchanan,
568 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1977)
Moore v. MacFarlane (In re
Interrogatories of the U.S. Dist.
Court Pursuant to Rule 21.1),
642 P.2d 496 (Colo. 1982)
Erickson v. Blair,
670 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1983)
Romero v. Sandoval,
685 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1984)

Type of Dispute

Result

Reference to
Democracy Canon

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed);
dissent (rejected)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed);
dissent (rejected)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed);
dissent (rejected)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Registration

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Candidate access

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Candidate access

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Candidate access

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Candidate access

Disenfranchised

Dissent (followed)

Registration

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Initiative petition

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Registration

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Registration

Disenfranchised

Dissent (followed)

Registration

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Candidate access

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

2020]
Moran v. Carlstrom,
775 P.2d 1176 (Colo. 1989)
Comm. for Better Health Care
for All Colo. Citizens v. Meyer,
830 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1992)
Meyer v. Lamm,
846 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1993)
McClellan v. Meyer,
900 P.2d 24 (Colo. 1995)
Fabec v. Beck,
922 P.2d 330 (Colo. 1996)
Buckley v. Chilcutt,
968 P.2d 112 (Colo. 1998)
Kuhn v. Williams,
418 P.3d 478 (Colo. 2018)

THE DEMOCRACY CANON

1999

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Initiative petition

Disenfranchised

Majority (mentioned);
dissent (followed)

Vote counting

Split

Majority (followed);
dissent (rejected)

Initiative petition

Disenfranchised

Concurrence (followed)

Initiative petition

Enfranchised

Majority (followed)

Initiative petition

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected);
dissent (followed)

Initiative petition

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

2000
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APPENDIX F
Post-2000 Democracy Canon Decisions

State

CA

IA

KS

MA
NE

NV

Case Name

Type of
Dispute

Result

Category 1: Democracy Canon Codified
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers
Ass’n v. Padilla,
Initiative
Enfranchised
363 P.3d 628 (Cal. 2016)
Cal. Cannabis Coal. v.
City of Upland, 401 P.3d
Initiative
Enfranchised
49 (Cal. 2017)

Reference to
Democracy
Canon

Majority
(followed)
Majority
(followed)

Taylor v. Cent. City Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 733 N.W.2d
655 (Iowa 2007)

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Richards v. Schmidt, 56
P.3d 274 (Kan. 2002)

Petitions

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

State ex rel. Schmidt v.
City of Wichita, 367 P.3d
282 (Kan. 2016)

Initiative

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

—

—

—

Petitions

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

City of North Platte v.
Tilgner, 803 N.W.2d 469
(Neb. 2011)

Initiative

Disenfranchised

Majority
(followed)

Citizens for Honest &
Responsible Gov’t v.
Heller, 11 P.3d 121 (Nev.
2000)

Recall petition

Disenfranchised

Majority
(mentioned)

Rogers v. Heller, 18 P.3d
1034 (Nev. 2001)

Initiative
petition

Disenfranchised

Dissent (followed)

Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys.
v. Nevadans for Sound
Gov’t, 100 P.3d 179 (Nev.
2004)

Initiative
petition

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

Miller v. Burk, 188 P.3d
1112 (Nev. 2008)

Candidate
access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

—
Pony Lake Sch. Dist. 30 v.
State Comm. for the
Reorganization of Sch.
Dists., 710 N.W.2d 609
(Neb. 2006)

2020]

THE DEMOCRACY CANON

2001

Strickland v. Waymire,
235 P.3d 605 (Nev. 2010)

Initiative
petition

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

In re Gray-Sadler, 753
A.2d 1101 (N.J. 2000)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

N.J. Democratic Party,
Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d
1028 (N.J. 2002)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

In re Contest of Nov. 8,
2005 Gen. Election for the
Office of Mayor of
Parsippany-Troy Hills,
934 A.2d 607 (N.J. 2007)

Election
contest

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed);
concurrence
(followed)

Comm. to Recall Robert
Mendez from the Office
of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 7
A.3d 720 (N.J. 2010)

Recall petition

Disenfranchised

Dissent (followed)

In re Contest of Nov. 8,
2011, Gen. Election of
Office of N.J. Gen.
Assembly, 40 A.3d 684
(N.J. 2012)

Election
contest

Unclear

Dissent (followed)

Tumpson v. Farina, 95
A.3d 210 (N.J. 2014)

Initiative

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

Gross v. Albany Cty. Bd.
of Elections, 819 N.E.2d
197 (N.Y. 2004)

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected);
dissent (followed)

Panio v. Sunderland, 824
N.E.2d 488 (N.Y. 2005)

Vote counting

Both

Majority
(followed); dissent
(rejected)

OR

Kucera v. Bradbury, 97
P.3d 1191 (Or. 2004)

Candidate
access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

SC

Broadhurst v. City of
Myrtle Beach Election
Comm’n, 537 S.E.2d 543
(S.C. 2000)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

Odom v. Town of McBee
Election Comm’n, 831
S.E.2d 429 (S.C. 2019)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

SD
UT

—
Adams v. Swensen, 108
P.3d 725 (Utah 2005)

—
Candidate
access

—

VT
WI

—
Roth v. LaFarge Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Canvassers, 677
N.W.2d 599 (Wis. 2004)

—

—

—

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

NJ

NY

Enfranchised

—
Majority
(followed)

2002
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League of Women Voters
of Wis. Educ. Network,
Inc. v. Walker, 851
N.W.2d 302 (Wis. 2014)

AL
AK

CT

IN

LA

Voter
eligibility

Disenfranchised

[Vol. 88

Dissent (followed)

Category 2: Rejection or Disregard of Democracy Canon
Fluker v. Wolff, 46 So. 3d
Vote counting
Disenfranchised Majority (rejected)
942 (Ala. 2010)
N.W. Cruiseship Ass’n of
Alaska, Inc. v. State, 145
P.3d 573 (Alaska 2006)

Initiative

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

Edgmon v. State, 152 P.3d
1154 (Alaska 2007)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

Municipality of
Anchorage v. Mjos, 179
P.3d 941 (Alaska 2008)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

Miller v. Treadwell, 245
P.3d 867 (Alaska 2010)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

Nageak v. Mallott, 426
P.3d 930 (Alaska 2018)

Vote counting

Both

Majority
(followed)

Dodge v. Meyer, 444 P.3d
159 (Alaska 2019)

Registration

Both

Majority
(followed)

Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 937
A.2d 13 (Conn. 2007)

Candidate
access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Bysiewicz v. Dinardo, 6
A.3d 726 (Conn. 2010)

Candidate
access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Butts v. Bysiewicz, 5 A.3d
932 (Conn. 2010)

Candidate
access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Arras v. Reg’l Sch. Dist.
No. 14, 125 A.3d 172
(Conn. 2015)

Vote counting

Unclear

Majority
(followed)

Keeley v. Ayala, 179 A.3d
1249 (Conn. 2018)

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Pabey v. Pastrick, 816
N.E.2d 1138 (Ind. 2004)

Election
contest

Both

Majority
(followed)

Burke v. Bennett, 907
N.E.2d 529 (Ind. 2009)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

White v. Ind. Democratic
Party, 963 N.E.2d 481
(Ind. 2012)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

Adkins v. Huckabay, 755
So. 2d 206 (La. 2000)

Vote counting

Disenfranchise

Majority
(followed)

Russell v. Goldsby, 780
So. 2d 1048 (La. 2000)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

2020]

THE DEMOCRACY CANON

2003

Becker v. Dean, 854 So.
2d 864 (La. 2003)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed); dissent
(rejected)

—
In re Request for
Advisory Op. Regarding
Constitutionality of 2005
PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444
(Mich. 2007)

—

—

—

Registration

Disenfranchised

Dissent (followed)

Wesley v. Wash. Cty.
Democratic Exec. Comm.,
235 So. 3d 1379 (Miss.
2017)

Election
contest

Unclear

Majority
(followed)

NH

In re McDonough, 816
A.2d 1022 (N.H. 2003)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Concurrence
(followed)

NM

State ex rel. League of
Women Voters v. Herrera,
203 P.3d 94 (N.M. 2009)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

—
—
—

—
—
—

—
—
—

Vote counting

Both

Majority
(followed)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

ME
MI

MS

NC
RI
VA
WV

—
—
—
State ex rel. Bowling v.
Greenbrier Cty. Comm’n,
575 S.E.2d 257 (W. Va.
2002)
Tillis v. Wright, 619
S.E.2d 235 (W. Va. 2005)

AZ
AR

CO

Category 3: Semi–Democracy Canon Codified
Ross v. Bennett, 265 P.3d
Recall
Enfranchised
356 (Ariz. 2011)

Majority
(followed)

Republican Party of
Garland Cty. v. Johnson,
193 S.W.3d 248 (Ark.
2004)

Candidate
access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Populist Party of Ark. v.
Chesterfield, 195 S.W.3d
354 (Ark. 2004)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

Herpin v. Head (In re
Title, Ballot Title &
Submission Clause,
Summary for 1999–2000
No. 255), 4 P.3d 485
(Colo. 2000)

Initiative

Unclear

Majority
(followed)

Kuhn v. Williams, 418
P.3d 478 (Colo. 2018)

Initiative
petition

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

2004
DE
FL
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—
Palm Beach Cty.
Canvassing Bd. v. Harris,
772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.
2000)
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—

—

—

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d
1243 (Fla. 2000)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed); dissent
(rejected)

Wright v. City of Miami
Gardens, 200 So. 3d 765
(Fla. 2016)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

GA
HI

—
Peroutka v. Cronin, 179
P.3d 1050 (Haw. 2008)

—
Candidate
access

—

—

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

ID
IL

—
Goodman v. Ward, 948
N.E.2d 580 (Ill. 2011)

—
Candidate
access

—

—

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Heleringer v. Brown, 104
S.W.3d 397 (Ky. 2003)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed);
concurrences
(followed)

Hardin v. Montgomery,
495 S.W.3d 686 (Ky.
2016)

Election
contest

Both

Majority
(followed)

Abrams v. Lamone, 919
A.2d 1223 (Md. 2007)

Candidate
access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Doe v. Montgomery Cty.
Bd. of Elections, 962 A.2d
342 (Md. 2008)

Initiative

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Fraternal Order of Police
Lodge 35 v. Montgomery
County, 80 A.3d 686 (Md.
2013)

Initiative

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

KY

MD

MN

Majority
(followed);
concurrence
(followed)
Concurrence
(followed)

Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer,
659 N.W.2d 724 (Minn.
2003)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Coleman v. Ritchie, 758
N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 2008)

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Coleman v. Ritchie, 762
N.W.2d 218 (Minn. 2009)

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Dissent (followed)

League of Women Voters
Minn. v. Ritchie, 819
N.W.2d 636 (Minn. 2012)

Registration

Disenfranchised

Dissent (followed)

2020]
MO

MT

ND

OH

THE DEMOCRACY CANON

2005

Lewis v. Gibbons, 80
S.W.3d 461 (Mo. 2002)

Candidate
access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected);
dissent (followed)

Comm. for a Healthy
Future, Inc. v. Carnahan,
201 S.W.3d 503 (Mo.
2006)

Initiative

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

Weinschenk v. State, 203
S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006)

Registration

Enfranchised

Dissent (followed)

Montanans Opposed to I166 v. Bullock, 285 P.3d
435 (Mont. 2012)

Initiative

Enfranchised

Concurrence
(followed)

Thompson v. Jaeger, 788
N.W.2d 586 (N.D. 2010)

Initiative

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Zaiser v. Jaeger, 822
N.W.2d 472 (N.D. 2012)

Initiative

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

In re Election Contest of
Dec. 14, 1999, 744 N.E.2d
745 (Ohio 2001)

Election
contest

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

State ex rel. Oster v.
Lorain Cty. Bd. of
Elections, 756 N.E.2d 649
(Ohio 2001)

Petition

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

State ex rel. Brady v.
Blackwell, 857 N.E.2d
1181 (Ohio 2006)

Candidate
access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected);
concurrence
(rejected)

State ex rel. Colvin v.
Brunner, 896 N.E.2d 979
(Ohio 2008)

Registration

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

State ex rel. Myles v.
Brunner, 899 N.E.2d 120
(Ohio 2008)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

State ex rel. Skaggs v.
Brunner, 900 N.E.2d 982
(Ohio 2008)

Vote counting

Disenfranchise

Majority
(followed);
concurrence
(followed)

State ex rel.
LetOhioVote.org v.
Brunner, 916 N.E.2d 462
(Ohio 2009)

Initiative

Enfranchises

Majority
(followed)

State ex rel. Linnabary v.
Husted, 8 N.E.3d 940
(Ohio 2014)

Candidate
access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

State ex rel. Espen v.
Wood Cty. Bd. of

Initiative

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

2006
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Elections, 110 N.E.3d
1222 (Ohio 2017)
Ohio Renal Ass’n v.
Kidney Dialysis Patient
Prot. Amendment Comm.,
111 N.E.3d 1139 (Ohio
2018)
OK
PA

TN

TX
WA

Initiative

Disenfranchise

Majority (rejected)

—

—

—

Candidate
access

Disenfranchised

Majority
(followed)

In re 2003 Gen. Election
for the Office of
Prothonotary, 849 A.2d
230 (Pa. 2004)

Election
contest

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

In re Canvass of Absentee
Ballots of Nov. 4, 2003
Gen. Election, 843 A.2d
1223 (Pa. 2004)

Vote counting

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

Shambach v. Bickhart,
845 A.2d 793 (Pa. 2004)

Vote counting

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed); dissent
(rejected)

In re Nader, 858 A.2d
1167 (Pa. 2004)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed);
concurrence
(followed)

In re Paulmier, 937 A.2d
364 (Pa. 2007)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

In re James, 944 A.2d 69
(Pa. 2008)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

In re Nomination of
Gales, 54 A.3d 855 (Pa.
2012)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

In re Beyer, 115 A.3d 835
(Pa. 2015)

Candidate
access

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

In re Vodvarka, 140 A.3d
639 (Pa. 2016)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

Reuther v. Del. Cty.
Bureau of Elections, 205
A.3d 302 (Pa. 2019)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

Halbert v. Shelby Cty.
Election Comm’n, 31
S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2000)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

—
—

—
—

—
—

—
—

—
In re Nomination of
Flaherty, 770 A.2d 327
(Pa. 2001)

2020]
WY

THE DEMOCRACY CANON

2007

Geringer v. Bebout, 10
P.3d 514 (Wyo. 2000)

Initiative

Disenfranchised

Dissent (followed)

Murphy v. State
Canvassing Bd., 12 P.3d
677 (Wyo. 2000)

Candidate
access

Enfranchised

Majority
(followed)

Cathcart v. Meyer, 88
P.3d 1050 (Wyo. 2004)

Initiative

Disenfranchised

Majority (rejected)

2008
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APPENDIX G
Latitudinal Review Summary
All States
Enfranchised
Disenfranchised
Other
Total

49 (49%)
41 (41%)
10 (10%)
100

Category 1:
Codified
12 (46%)
12 (46%)
2 (8%)
26

Category 2:
Rejected
11 (46%)
7 (29%)
6 (25%)
24

Category 3:
Ambiguous
26 (52%)
22 (44%)
2 (4%)
50

2020]

THE DEMOCRACY CANON

2009

APPENDIX H
Cases Citing Codified Democracy Canon After 1960
State
Nebraska
Nevada

Oregon
Wisconsin

Case Name
Applicable to All Election Provisions
—
LaPorta v. Broadbent,
530 P.2d 1404 (Nev. 1975)
Long v. Swackhamer,
538 P.2d 587 (Nev. 1975)
Eller Media Co. v. City of Reno,
59 P.3d 437 (Nev. 2002)
Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Nevadans for
Sound Gov’t, 100 P.3d 179 (Nev. 2004)
Lueck v. Teuton, 219 P.3d 895 (Nev. 2009)
Kucera v. Bradbury,
97 P.3d 1191 (Or. 2004)
Clapp v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1,
124 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1963)
Gradinjan v. Boho (In re Chairman in Town
of Worcester), 139 N.W.2d 557 (Wis. 1966)
Lanser v. Koconis,
214 N.W.2d 425 (Wis. 1974)
Beckstrom v. Kornsi,
217 N.W.2d 283 (Wis. 1974)
State ex rel. Ahlgrimm v. State Elections
Bd., 263 N.W.2d 152 (Wis. 1978)

California
Iowa
Kansas
Massachusetts
New Jersey

New York

Result
—
Enfranchised
Enfranchised
Enfranchised
Enfranchised
Enfranchised
Disenfranchised
Enfranchised
Disenfranchised
Enfranchised
Other
Disenfranchised

McNally v. Tollander,
302 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 1981)

Other

Roth v. LaFarge Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Canvassers, 677 N.W.2d 599 (Wis. 2004)

Enfranchised

Applicable to Specific Election Provision
—
—
—
—
Lesniak v. Budzash,
626 A.2d 1073 (N.J. 1993)
Holloway v. Byrne,
874 A.2d 504 (N.J. 2005)
—

—
—
—
—
Other
Enfranchised
—

2010
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South Carolina
South Dakota

Utah
Vermont

Knight v. State Bd. of Canvassers,
374 S.E.2d 685 (S.C. 1988)
Thoms v. Andersen,
235 N.W.2d 898 (S.D. 1975)
Larson v. Locken,
262 N.W.2d 752 (S.D. 1978)
Pankhurst v. New Effington Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 54-3 (In re Election Contest as to
Reorganization of New Effington Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 54-3), 462 N.W.2d 185 (S.D.
1990)
Duffy v. Mortenson,
497 N.W.2d 437 (S.D. 1993)
McIntyre v. Wick,
558 N.W.2d 347 (S.D. 1996)
Becker v. Pfeifer,
588 N.W.2d 913 (S.D. 1999)
Adams v. Swensen,
108 P.3d 725 (S.D. 2005)
—

[Vol. 88
Enfranchised
Other
Disenfranchised

Enfranchised

Enfranchised
Other
Enfranchised
Enfranchised
—

